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PUNISHMENT AND WORK LAW COMPLIANCE: 
LESSONS FROM CHILE 
César F. Rosado Marzán1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION: LEARNING FROM A “JAGUAR” 
Labor and employment (hereinafter referred to as “work law”) 
activists and reformers find it increasingly more difficult to obtain 
redress for violations of workers’ rights.  As American activist and legal 
reformer Kim Bobo has said, “wage theft” has become an epidemic in 
the United States.
2
  She mentions that according to the United States 
Department of Labor, all poultry plants steal workers’ wages
3
 and many 
 
 PhD, JD. Assistant Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology (“IIT”) - 
Chicago-Kent College of Law.  Member of Regulating Markets and Labour Programme, 
Stockholm University, Institute for Social Private Law, Faculty of Law.  This study was 
made possible thanks to the IIT-Chicago-Kent College of Law summer research support 
and the Handelsman Fund.  It was also made possible thanks to the support of the 
Chilean Labor Directorate, whose directors, Patricia Silva and María Cecilia Sánchez, 
permitted me to work alongside its inspectors and use both office space and computing 
and information technology resources of the public institution for seven and half months 
with no expectations but that I share my research results once available.  I thank 
Katherine Baker, Rodrigo Correa, Caterina Guidi, Paola Díaz, María Ester Feres, Alvaro 
Flores, Sergio Gamonal, Sarah Harding, Hal Krent, Marty Malin, Ariel Rosel, Verónica 
Riquelme, César Toledo, José Luis Ugarte, and Michael Zimmer for reading previous 
drafts of this article and providing comments.  I also thank the participants of the Faculty 
Workshop of IIT-Chicago-Kent College of Law and the University of Illinois College 
Law for their helpful feedback.  I must also thank Patrick Ferrell, Claire Alfus and the 
editorial board of the Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal for their invaluable 
editorial assistance.  Finally, I thank the innumerable subjects that I observed and 
interviewed in Chile during the seven-and-a-half month ethnography that preceded this 
paper.  All errors and omissions remain the sole responsibility of the author.  Address all 
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 1.  This article contains numerous foreign language sources.  The Journal edits and 
confirms these sources to the best of its ability but cannot guarantee the accuracy of all 
statements.  All foreign sources are on file with the author. 
 2.  See KIM BOBO, WAGE THEFT IN AMERICA: WHY MILLIONS OF WORKING 
AMERICANS ARE NOT GETTING PAID-AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 8 (2009). 
 3.  See id. at 7. 
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other industries trail closely behind.
4
  She calls for more inspection 
resources and punishment tools to better police employers.
5
  The 
Employee Free Choice Act (“EFCA”) was a proposed bill that the labor 
movement hoped would reform the collective labor laws and make it 
easier for workers to join unions.
6
  Importantly, it was also based on 
providing the National Labor Relations Board (“NLRB”) with more 




Placing the focus on punishing violators certainly has an appeal, 
especially given the dire condition of workers’ rights today.  Wage theft 
is rampant throughout multiple industries.
8
  The capacity of workers to 
build and join unions as guaranteed by the NLRA, compared with the 
actual percentage of private sector employees who are members of a 
union – 24% in 1973, down to 13.5% in 2001, and dropping to less than 
7% in 2010
9
 – is also cause for grave concern for organized labor and 
workers who want to join unions.
10
 
This article does not necessarily take issue with the general request 
for more resources and sanctions to enforce work laws.  Deterrence is 
important.  However, scholarship discussing the role of punishment in 
regulation and enforcement in work law, but also in many other areas of 
law, forces us to pause before putting too many eggs in the punishment 
basket.  For many years we have now come to comprehend that effective 





 4.  See id. 
 5.  See id. at chs. 5-6, 9. 
 6.  See id. at 86. 
 7.  See id. 
 8.  Id. at 9. 
 9.  Barry T. Hirsch & David A. Macpherson, Union Membership and Coverage 
Database from the Current Population Survey, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 349, 352 
tbl.1 (2002); Steven Greenhouse, Union Membership in U.S. Fell to a 70-Year Low Last 
Year, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/22/business/22union.html?_r=1.  
 10.  Although clearly divided on the issue, survey data from 2005 revealed that over 
50% of non-unionized American workers would like to have union representation at 
work. Richard B. Freeman, Do Workers Still Want Unions? More Than Ever, ECON. 
POL’Y INST. (Feb. 22, 2007), http://www.gpn.org/bp182.html. 
 11.  See generally IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) 
[hereinafter AYRES & BRAITHWAITE]; JOHN BRAITHWAITE, TO PUNISH OR PERSUADE: 
ENFORCEMENT OF COAL MINE SAFETY (1985) [hereinafter BRAITHWAITE, PUNISH OR 
PERSUADE]; John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies, 34 
WORLD DEV. 884 (2006) [hereinafter Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation]; Roberto 
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I spent seven and a half months studying the labor inspectorate of 
Chile, a government agency that enforces work law mostly by punishing 
those who break the laws.  That empirical study, which will be detailed 
in this article,
12
 supports the view that punishment is insufficient and 
may even backfire when enforcing work law if not supplemented with 
other enforcement strategies.  For example, in the 2010 incident in Chile 
where thirty-three miners were trapped in a mine 2300 feet below 
ground,
13
 only to miraculously be rescued, a labor inspector had visited 
the mine before the collapse and established that it was a health and 
safety risk to the workers.
14
  Yet, rather than closing the mine, as the 
inspector could have done under the law, he only issued a meaningless 
fine equaling approximately U.S. $6000.
15
  The workers continued to 
work in the mine even though it was officially considered a work hazard.  
The rest is history.  The mine collapsed and a mix of great luck, heroic 




Why did the labor inspector issue such a meaningless fine if he had 
found that the mine was a danger to workers and the inspector could 
close it?  As detailed here, for years the Mining Ministry of Chile, 
supportive of mining interests, took over the jurisdiction of the mine 
under dubious legal grounds and kept it open.
17
  Agencies can 
commonly intrude the jurisdictional space of other agencies.
18
 Such 
intra-state conflicts even happen in Chile, a country where the rule of 
law is allegedly zealously protected.
19
 
The San José mine incident and other cases detailed in this article 
 
Pires, Promoting Sustainable Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance 
Outcomes in Brazil, 147 INT’L LAB. REV. 199 (2008). 
 12.  See infra Part V. 
 13.  Trapped Chile Miner’s Family Sues Owners and Officials, BBC NEWS (Aug. 
26, 2010), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-11102478. 
 14.  César F. Rosado Marzán, Working for Another Miracle, CHI.-KENT C.L. FAC. 
BLOG (Sept. 14, 2010), http://blogs.kentlaw.edu/faculty/2010/09/working-for-another-
miracle.html [hereinafter Rosado Marzán, Another Miracle]. 
 15.  Id.  
 16.  See Victor Herrero, All 33 Miners Rescued from Chile Mine, USA TODAY (Oct. 
14, 2010, 12:13 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-10-12-Chile-
miners_N.htm#.T5lP58BhJyY.email.  
 17.  See infra Part VII.  
 18.  The now classical sociologist, Max Weber, already discussed how state 
administrators may hold “office secrets” to hoard power and encroach on areas not under 
their authority.  MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN OUTLINE OF INTERPRETATIVE 
SOCIOLOGY 992 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 
Univ. of Cal. Press 1978) (1968). 
 19.  See infra Part III.A.  
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lead me to conclude that the Chilean case supports what some legal 
scholars and social scientists have been finding about punishment-based, 
“command and control” regulation and enforcement: a culture of 
resistance develops when agencies insist on mostly punishing the 
regulated actors.  Resistance can then lead to noncompliance.  
Participatory arrangements for workplace governance and flexible 
standard settings can help reduce resistance and provide a better 
environment for enforcement. 
This article is divided in the following way: 
Section II of the article describes the reasons why punishment 
matters for work law enforcement.  Conversely, Section III describes the 
literature advocating for non-punishment-based strategies. 
Section IV details how Chile is a country with high rule-of-law 
indicators.  It also details its punitive administrative enforcement 
institution for work law enforcement.  Section IV further explains why 
Chile is a useful case study for understanding the pros and cons of 
punishment strategies.  Finally, the Section speaks to regulatory 
polemics and theories of punishment (or persuasion) detailed in Sections 
II and III. 
Section V explains my seven-and-a-half month ethnography of the 
Chilean labor inspectorate and its labor courts to understand how its 
enforcement institutions work in practice.  This ethnography lets us 
understand the realities and not just the formalities of regulation and 
enforcement. 
Section VI details the likely strengths of the punitive system that I 
observed in Chile where labor inspectors can fine for a diversity of work 
law infractions due to their general competence over all sections of the 
labor code,
20
 which creates a significant authority for inspectors to 
leverage against employers who fail to follow the country’s work laws.  
This punitive strategy, to fine for any and all infractions, is also useful to 
resolve individual termination settlements in which labor inspectors are 
readily involved.  Although employment dismissals fall within the 
exclusive jurisdiction of labor courts, inspectors who believe that the 
employer is violating the law may seek to fine the employer for failing 
to provide proper documentation and other unrelated infractions during 
the pre-trial conciliation process.  Fining increases the cost of the 
termination to the employer and compels the employer to settle.  Finally, 
inspectors can also serve as mere “nuisances.”  Even without fining, 
 
 20.  Some of these sections include collective labor law, individual employment 
law, employment discrimination, and health and safety. 
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their visits at workplaces get in the way of production.  Since no 
employer wants an inspector snooping around the workplace, the mere 
likelihood of a visit by an inspector may deter the employer from 
breaking the law. 
Section VII of the article details the soft “underbelly” of the DT, 
which spurs slack enforcement and noncompliance.  Employer 
resistance against the DT is at the heart of this soft underbelly.  
Resistance is commonplace in Chile, particularly when the inspectorate 
imposes stiff penalties on strong employers who can fight back through 
legal challenges and political strategies.  One example where resistance 
rendered the inspectorate powerless was during the inspectorate’s 
attempt to enforce a law that limited subcontracting.  Because fining was 
apparently insufficient to compel compliance with the law in the 
important mining sector, the inspectorate ordered the publicly owned 
mining company, Codelco, to directly hire 5,000 employees that it had 
allegedly illegally subcontracted.  Codelco and the subcontractors took 
the inspectorate to court alleging, among other things, that the 
inspectorate attempted to enforce an equitable remedy by commanding 
them to hire 5,000 workers.  The employers argued correctly, that the 
inspectorate could only establish facts, determine a violation, and fine.  
The Supreme Court of Chile not only held in favor of the employers and 
reversed the actions of the inspectorate, but determined that the 
inspectorate could not even establish violations of the subcontracting 
law because such actions would entail interpreting labor contracts, a 
competence reserved only to labor courts.  As a result of this decision, 
the anti-subcontracting law was rendered effectively unenforceable.  The 
situation would have been different if the labor inspectorate could have 
coordinated bargaining between Codelco, the subcontractors, and 
employee representatives to bring the large company into compliance 
gradually.  Cooperation could have worked better than a unilateral and 
illegal mandate made to the corporation. 
A second important case shows that employers can also effectively 
resist even when the inspectorate acts legally.  This was the case of the 
San José mine, as previously discussed.
21
  There, the inspectorate had 
closed the mine in 2003 when a partial collapse occurred.  The mine was 
reopened shortly thereafter by the Servicio Nacional de Geología y 
Minería, or National Service for Geology and Mining (hereinafter 
referred to as “Sernageomin,” its Spanish acronym), a sub agency of the 
Mining Ministry with the authority to close and open mines.  In 2010, 
 
 21.  See discussion supra pp. 345-46. 
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weeks before the collapse that held the 33 miners captive, there was 
another partial collapse.  The inspectorate went to the mine but did not 
close it, claiming that closure was under the competence of 
Sernageomin.  Such statements were clearly inapposite to the law, as 
will be discussed in this article.  Politics prevailed over law.  I argue the 
case would have been different if the inspectorate not only closed the 
mine but had authority to negotiate with the mine owners, Sernageomin, 
and workers in order to persuade them on a plan for a gradual reopening 
of the mine that met all health and safety concerns.  Strong punishment, 
but also cooperation, was needed as this article will argue. 
Section VIII details an instance where the inspectorate 
experimented with a non-punitive strategy for mass compliance with the 
work laws.  This experience related to the massive terminations ordered 
by employers during the terrible earthquake that struck Chile in 2010.  
Terminations reached about 9000 in just a few weeks.  In some cities 
such as Concepción, unemployment reached unheard of levels of close 
to 20%, generating a social crisis on top of a natural disaster.  Then, the 
inspectorate issued a simple interpretation of the termination rules.  The 
interpretation stated that the earthquake could not be generally used to 
justify terminations under force majeure, one of the statutory defined 
causes for termination in Chile.  As a result of that administrative 
interpretation, which was not legally binding but was disseminated 
widely by the press and government, and with support of the President 
of the country, more than 2600 of the 9000 terminations were voluntarily 
rescinded by employers in a matter of weeks.  There was no need to send 
armies of inspectors to fine.  Primarily pedagogical actions did much of 
the compliance work. 
Section IX concludes the article by arguing how the Chilean case 
unambiguously supports scholarship that calls for more than just 
punishment for work law enforcement.  Even if the country is generally 
highly regarded for its rule-of-law reputation, its capacity to compel 
employers to comply with the work laws is limited by a truncated 
punishment orientation.  Chile should experiment with pedagogical 
strategies, and so should the United States and other jurisdictions still 
enveloped in legalistic, adversarial, and punishment-based work law 
compliance regimes. 
II. HOW PUNISHMENT MATTERS 
The case of punishment is straightforward.  It helps deter the 
scofflaws.  Punishment in the form of sanctions, fines, and expensive 
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lawsuits should act as deterrents on those employers who are considering 
not complying with work laws.
22
  If agencies in charge of enforcing the 
laws have thin resources and weak sanctioning powers, employers will 
quickly take the hint that noncompliance has no bottom line 
consequences.  Paying overtime, respecting concerted activities by 
workers, and following health and safety rules have real costs.  
Noncompliance may not.  Under such a structure of incentives to not 
comply, noncompliance may become rampant. 
In the case of wage theft, for example, the Executive Director of the 
Interfaith Worker Jusitce, Kim Bobi has argued that the Department of 
Labor has inadequate resources to police wages and hours regulations.
23
  
She calls for more inspectors and harsher punishments.
24
 As she told the 
AFL-CIO in an interview: 
Most important, we need more cops on the job.  There are 750 
investigators for 130 million workers in the country, and it’s just not 
enough.  I believe we need to quadruple that staff.  Now, some people 
ask how we can do that in this economic environment.  But my 
response is that if we make it a priority, we can make it happen.  After 
9/11, we hired 52,000 people to go through my luggage and pull out 
my toothpaste.  It was a priority, and we made it happen. 
Finally, we need to have meaningful punishments.  If you steal wages 
from workers, there needs to be consequences and you need to feel 
them.  That’s especially true for repeat violators.  Right now, only 40 
percent of repeat violators even get fined at all.  Even if back wages 
are paid, we’ve found it’s usually about 50 cents on the dollar.  
Employers are making out like bandits.  If they steal wages, it’s a good 
business plan because in the end it costs them less.
25
 
According to Bobi, the incentives against wage theft seem to be 
misplaced.  The noncompliance situation must be fixed by hiring more 
“cops” and punishing more. 
In the case of the collective labor law, EFCA promised to resolve 
the dwindling rates of union density by providing, among other reforms, 
new enforcement powers to the NLRB, namely to issue punitive 
 
 22.  See BRAITHWAITE, PUNISH OR PERSUADE, supra note 11, at 92-93. 
 23.  See BOBO, supra note 2, at 118-21. 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  Kim Bobo, Wage Theft in America: A Crisis We Can Solve, AFL-CIO, 
http://www.rnsworkingtogether.net/mediacenter/speakout/kim_bobo.cfm (last visited 
Apr. 13, 2012).   
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damages and civil penalties against employers who violated the law.
26
 
The logic was clear: by increasing the costs of noncompliance in the 
form of higher penalties, noncompliance with the NLRA could be 
deterred. 
On the health and safety front, scholars have noted the almost 
disastrous state of federal workplace health and safety law, particularly 
that related to the Occupational Health and Safety Act (“OSHA”).
27
  
Even though the Occupational Health and Safety Administration was 
redesigned during the Clinton era, the agency has undertaken a number 
of compliance-based initiatives since the Reagan years, including the 
Voluntary Protection Program (“VPP”).
28
  The VPP provides that 
employers who voluntarily establish workplace safety programs and 
accept regular inspections by the agency will, in return, obtain laxer 
punishment if violations are found.
29
  However, the Obama 
Administration seems to have changed course when it comes to 
compliance assistance at OSHA.  As one publication for the professional 
development of management-side lawyers expressed, the Obama 
administration has taken a “pro-worker” stance that seems to have 
become more assertively punitive.
30
  As the publication states: 
The fiscal year 2010 budget funded one hundred new OSHA 
inspectors, and the fiscal year 2011 budget proposes to hire twenty-five 
more inspectors and move [thirty-five] OSHA employees from 
 
 26.  Employee Free Choice Act, H.R. 1409, 111th Cong. § 4 (2009).  The other two 
important elements of EFCA were “cards checks” and interest arbitration for first 
contracts.  “Card checks”, or proof of majority support through documents signed by 
employees, usually a union card, would help unions organize workplaces out the need 
for time-consuming, costly and adversarial NLRB administered union elections. See id. 
§§ 2-3.  The second element of the reform would have mandated interest arbitration for 
first contracts if the parties failed to reach a new contract within a specified period of 
time.  See id.  Compulsory interest arbitration for first contracts would have guaranteed 
that the union would obtain a contract and not find itself in endless negotiations that can 
destroy the momentum and support of the union at the workplace. 
 27.  See Orly Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory and Industrial Relations: The 
Governance of Workplace Safety, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 1071, 1078 (2005) [hereinafter 
Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory]; see also EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, 
GOING BY THE BOOK: THE PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 28 (1982) 
(describing how OSHA barely has any effect on workplace safety).  
 28.  See Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 343-44 (2005) [hereinafter Estlund, Rebuilding the 
Law].  
 29.  See id. at 343.  
 30.  Michael R. Blum, The Trend for Increased Regulation of Employers Under the 
Current Administration, in COMPLYING WITH EMPLOYMENT REGULATIONS 29, 51 (Eddie 
Fournier ed., 2010).  
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compliance assistance to enforcement.
31
 
In this manner, the current Obama administration seems to be 
increasing resources and penalties against those who violate the law. 
Such calls and policies for tougher sanctions make intuitive sense, 
especially given the state of (dis)organized labor, wage theft, and 
employer impunity in the face of health and safety law violations.  
However, as we will see below, there are reasons to be at least skeptical 
of the role of mere punishment for work law compliance. 
III. HOW NON-PUNITIVE ENFORCEMENT ALSO MATTERS 
While stronger and tougher enforcement may deter violations of 
work law, scholarship based on “New Governance,” responsive 
regulation, and traditional “Latin” inspection suggests that more than 
mere punishment is needed.  Participatory processes, combining 
persuasion with punishment, and applying standards flexibly – attuned 
to industry and market realities – are likely as important as punishment. 
A. New Governance 
New Governance is a normative movement within the law that 
seeks to bring together various strands of scholarly work spread across 
various disciplines.
32
  It tries to fill in the gap between traditional 
regulation and neoliberal deregulation.
33
  According to Professor 
Bradley C. Karkkainen, New Governance generally refers to a “broad 
family of innovative modes of public governance” in the European 
Union, the United States, and elsewhere that steer away from “the 
familiar model of command-style, fixed regulation by administrative 
 
 31.  Id.  These statements reflect exactly the agenda that the Obama administration 
itself has laid out for OSHA.  David Michaels, the Assistant Secretary of Labor for 
Occupational Safety and Health expressed that because there was “a new sheriff in 
town” OSHA would not only attempt to hire more inspectors but “return to the original 
intent of the OSH Act and make setting and enforcing workplace standards [their] central 
focus.”  David Michaels, Assistant Sec’y of Labor for Occupational Safety & Health, 
Speech Delivered at the American Society of Safety Engineers Professional 
Development Conference & Expo (June 14, 2010) (transcript available at 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show_document?p_table=SPEECHES&p_id
=2221).  This focus included moving personnel to “enforcement.” Id. 
 32.  See Bradley C. Karkkainen, Reply, “New Governance” in Legal Thought and 
in the World: Some Splitting as Antidote to Overzealous Lumping, 89 MINN. L. REV. 471, 
471-72 (2004). 
 33.  See id. at 471-73.  
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fiat” regulation, and “toward a new model of collaborative, multi-party, 
multi-level, adaptive, problem-solving” regulation.
34
 
Professor Cynthia Estlund summarizes the two main characteristics 
of New Governance as “decentering” and “reflexive.”
35
  Decentering 
refers to bringing non-state actors into the regulatory process by giving 
them a real say.
36
  Reflexivity refers to replacing direct regulatory 
commands with “self-regulation.”
37
  The general idea behind most 
strands of New Governance is that state and non-state actors participate 
in the acts of creating and enforcing rules.
38
 
New Governance advocates argue that traditional regulation – one 
that is prescribed and enforced only by the state, and otherwise known as 
“command and control” – is to blame for most regulatory crises, both 
within and outside of the workplace.
39
  “Command and control” is 
essentially a rules-based regulatory regime that reached its full 
expression in the Great Society programs of the 1960s and “the 
consumer protection and ‘environmental decade’ of the 1970s.”
40
  
Europe and other parts of the world shared similar regulatory 
frameworks.
41
  In this manner, command and control suits the traditional 
Weberian bureaucratic characteristics.
42
  Command and control has 
been: 
[H]ierarchical, state-centric, bureaucratic, top-down and expert-driven.  
[It] attempted to microengineer solutions to societal problems through 
a series of fragmentary, piecemeal, and highly prescriptive regulatory 
 
 34.  See id. at 472-73.   
 35.  See CYNTHIA ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: FROM SELF-
REGULATION TO CO-REGULATION 136 (2010) [hereinafter ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE 
WORKPLACE]. 
 36.  See id. 
 37.  See id.  Exactly what scholars mean by “self-regulation” is contested.  Estlund 
develops one view of self-regulation, “co-regulation,” where employers and employees 
set the rules together.  Id. at 161.  Public enforcement also matters.  Id. at 241.  Ayres 
and Braithwaite, scholars from whom some New Governance advocates draw their ideas, 
advocate for so-called “enforced self-regulation” where parties do not only cooperate to 
regulate themselves, but their rules can be thereafter enforced by a public body.  AYRES 
& BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11, at 103; see also Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall 
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 342, 388 (2004) [hereinafter Lobel, The Renew Deal] (detailing how “hard” 
ordering of the regulatory model should be replaced with a “soft” one and providing a 
more deregulatory view on New Governance). 
 38.  See ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 35, at 136. 
 39.  See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 37, at 357-58, 361. 
 40.  Karkkainen, supra note 32, at 473-74. 
 41.  Id. 
 42.  See WEBER, supra note 18, at 956-1005. 
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interventions, and it tended to produce an impossibly complex and 




In this manner, traditional command-and-control regulation 
imposes rules in a top-down fashion from the state, and is oftentimes too 
complicated to be rationally instituted.  It may be under or over-
inclusive, making it ineffective.
44
 Conversely, agencies may simply be 
captured and rendered agents of particularistic interests.
45
  Regulators 
frequently may also count with little reliable information about the 
conditions of regulated parties and the impact of the regulations on those 
parties, making it highly ineffectual.
46
  The emblematic case of 
regulatory failure is OSHA, an agency with a morass of rules made in 
eras with now antiquated technologies and obsolete knowledge of health, 
safety, and market contexts.
47
  For most work law scholars, the 
unpalatable alternative that is deregulation and the potential crises 
associated with it has led to a “Third Way” of thought regarding 
regulation — New Governance.
48
  New Governance advocates view 
with care policies calling for stricter penalties.
49
  They claim that 
attention needs to be put not just on punishing the violators, but also on 
how the regulations themselves are drafted and by whom.
50
  In fact, New 
Governance values removing the enforcement process from the state.
51
  
It does not leave the state devoid of a role, but infuses the regulatory and 
enforcement process with civil society participation.  In the case of wage 
theft, for example, New Governance would likely focus on establishing 
minimum wages through participatory processes where workers and 
employers have a voice.  Enforcement would not be left only to state 
enforcers, but workers would have a role to play as the eyes and ears of 
the state enforcers.  Their whistleblower role would be zealously 
protected by courts and enforced through private causes of action.  In the 
 
 43.  Karkkainen, supra note 32, at 474. 
 44.  See Gunther Teubner, Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions, in 
JURIDIFICATION OF SOCIAL SPHERES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS IN THE AREAS OF LABOR, 
CORPORATE, ANTITRUST AND SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 3, 9 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1987). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  PETER EVANS, EMBEDDED AUTONOMY: STATES AND INDUSTRIAL 
TRANSFORMATION 31-32 (1995) (describing how mere “aloof detachment” by 
bureaucrats is not enough for effective public administration). 
 47.  See Lobel, The Renew Deal, supra note 37, at 415-16.  
 48.  Id. at 442. 
 49.  In fact, Orly Lobel calls directly for “‘softer’ processes that either replace or 
complement the traditional ‘hard’ ordering of the regulatory model.”  Id. at 388. 
 50.  Id. at 391. 
 51.  ESTLUND, REGOVERNING THE WORKPLACE, supra note 35, at 146. 
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case of collective labor law, any national reforms could be directed by 
participatory processes between the regulated actors – employers and 
workers – perhaps not too differently from the prescribed methods of 
tripartism promulgated by the International Labor Organization.
52
  
Similarly, effective workplace health and safety laws should require 




B. Responsive Regulation and Latin Inspectorates 
New Governance has been inspired by a number of heterodox 
regulatory perspectives including, importantly, “responsive 
regulation.”
54
  Responsive regulation is a policy-making movement that 
stems from the work of John Braithwaite and his collaborators.
55
  It 
seeks to create a regulatory strategy that protects “‘institutional integrity 
while taking into account new problems, new forces in the environment, 
new demands, and expectations.’”
56
  It considers the changing nature of 
social realities and the limits of law and regulation to accommodate and 
predict such changes.
57
  In this manner, responsive regulation attempts to 
account for unintended consequences of the regulatory endeavor.  It calls 
for a regulatory framework that adapts to changing realities while 
keeping faithful to general principles or standards. 
In trying to delineate an effective regulatory enforcement strategy, 
responsive regulation advocates strive to combine punishment with 
persuasion.
58
  According to responsive regulation adherents, punishment 
works only with the “bad apples.”
59
  Enforcement strategies that focus 
only on punishment generate adversarial relationships with the regulated 
parties that may result in resistance, culminating in political conflicts 
against the regulators and, perhaps, against regulation generally.
60
  
Persuasion is effective for those regulated parties that want to follow the 
 
 52.  See Labour Law, INT’L LAB. ORG., http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/areas-of-
work/labour-law/lang—en/index.htm (last visited June 7, 2012). 
 53.  See generally Lobel, Interlocking Regulatory, supra note 27, at 1071. 
 54.  See generally AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11; BRAITHWAITE, PUNISH OR 
PERSUADE, supra note 11; Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 11, at 884. 
 55.  See Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 11, at 884.   
 56.  Id. at 884 (citing PHILIP SELZNICK, THE MORAL COMMONWEALTH: SOCIAL 
THEORY AND THE PROMISE OF COMMUNITY 336 (1992)).  
 57.  See id. at 884-85. 
 58.  See BRAITHWAITE, PUNISH OR PERSUADE, supra note 11. 
 59.  See id.  
 60.  BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 27, at 112-16. 
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law but because of ignorance and related considerations cannot 
comply.
61
  Responsive regulation approaches the regulated actors 
through an escalating strategy that starts with persuasive tactics 
(“carrots”) and moves to deterrent, punishment tactics (“sticks”), 
reserving the ultimate penalty — “incapacitation,” such as closing down 
operations — to those actors who persistently fail to comply.
62
  
Regulators should be “benign big guns,” the proverbial authority figures 
that “speak softly and carry big sticks.”
63
  The idea is that 
“noncompliance comes to be seen as . . . a slippery slope that inexorably 
leads to a sticky end.”
64
 
Moreover, according to Professors Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite, 
the state should not be left alone in the task of regulation.
65
  Civil society 
should be a central part of the enforcement pyramid to serve as a check 
on state capture and to perform regulatory tasks such as “naming and 
shaming, restorative justice, consumer boycotts, strikes and litigation.”
66
  
In this manner, regulation is not a purely top-down activity, but it is also 
a bottom-up endeavor.  It is here from where New Governance drew part 
of its inspiration. 
The literature on “Latin” inspectorates also shares some similarities 
with responsive regulation, particularly that dealing with the ways 
regulators deal with “good and bad apples.”
67
  “Latin” labor 
inspectorates are work law enforcement institutions whose main agents 
are labor inspectors, “street-level bureaucrats”
68
 who function as a sort 
of labor police “on the beat.”
69
  Following what could be identified as a 
responsive regulatory framework, Latin labor inspectors are said not to 
 
 61.  AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11, at 20-21. 
 62.  Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 11, at 887. 
 63.  AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 11, at 19. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  See id.  
 66.  Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation, supra note 11, at 888. 
 67.  See ANDREW SCHRANK & MICHAEL PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, SERIE ESTUDIOS Y 
PERSPECTIVAS: NORMS, REGULATIONS AND LABOR STANDARDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, at 
43-47, U.N. Doc. 77, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.G.44 (2007), available at 
http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/3/28113/Serie%2077.pdf [hereinafter SCHRANK 
& PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO]; Michael Piore & Andrew Schrank, Toward a Managed 
Flexibility: The Revival of Labour Inspection in the Latin World, 147 INT’L LAB. REV. 1, 
14-16 (2008) [hereinafter Piore & Schrank, Managed Flexibility]; Pires, supra note 11, 
at 199-201; Andrew Schrank, Professionalization and Probity in the Patrimonial State: 
Labor Inspectors in the Dominican Republic, 51 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y.  91, 92 
(2009) [hereinafter Schrank, Professionalism and Probity].  
 68.  MICHAEL LIPSKY, STREET-LEVEL BUREAUCRACY: DILEMMAS OF THE INDIVIDUAL 
IN PUBLIC SERVICES 2 (2007). 
 69.  Id. at 4. 
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depend primarily on sanctions (“sticks”) to compel compliance with the 
work laws.  They are said to use persuasive “conciliation and/or 
remediation” enforcement strategies.
70
  Under this approach, labor 
inspectors attempt to persuade employers that work law compliance is 
efficient and good for their business rather than just a cost that will make 
the firm less competitive.
71
  Inspectors can impose sanctions, but these 
are not their main or only tools to compel compliance with the law.
72
  
Following what seems to be the responsive, pyramidal structure of 
compliance, Latin labor inspectors reserve sanctions for the more serious 
cases.
73
  They use persuasion as their main tool of compliance.
74
  Such 
strategies may include everything from simply making the employer 
cognizant of his or her duties under the law, promoting best practices to 
help employers implement the law efficiently or bringing together 
parties to the bargaining table to develop plans on how to bring the firm 
into compliance gradually, but surely.
75
 
Another important characteristic of Latin labor inspectorates is their 
centralized administrative structure and general competence.
76
  They 
have authority to police work law compliance generally and are not 
limited by areas of specialization, as tends to exist in the Anglo-
American world, particularly in the US.
77
  Rather than having exclusive 
groups of inspectors and other agents housed in various enforcement 
agencies with different jurisdictions –for example the NLRB, the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Office, OSHA, the Wages and Hours Division 
of the Department of Labor, and their state-level pairs – labor inspectors 




Administrative centralization is supposed to enhance the 
discretionary authority of labor inspectors.  This enables them to 
strategically choose which industries and employers to focus on and to 
discover where more acute noncompliance problems exist.  In this 
 
 70.  See Michael J. Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies in Labor Market Regulation, in 
THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 385, 388 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille eds., 2011) 
[hereinafter Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies].  
 71.  See Schrank, Professionalization and Probity, supra note 67, at 100-01. 
 72.  See Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies, supra note 70, at 387-88. 
 73.  Schrank, Professionalization and Probity, supra note 67, at 101-02 (detailing 
pedagogic and escalating sanctions in “Latin” inspection systems). 
 74.  See Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies, supra note 70, at 388; Schrank, 
Professionalization and Probity, supra note 67, at 101. 
 75.  Schrank, Professionalization and Probity, supra note 67, at 101. 
 76.  See SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 10. 
 77.  See id. at 10, 14. 
 78.  Id. 
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manner, discretion also provides the inspectorate with flexibility when 
applying sanctions or otherwise exerting their authority. 
79
 As Professor 
Michael Piore argues: 
Because the inspectors cannot possibly inspect for every provision of 
the code, they are effectively in a position to pick and choose which 
provisions they will look at, where to focus their attention. They can 
weigh the different aspects of the law, and in effect the different goals 
of legislation, against each other and against the viability of the 
enterprise, adjusting the regulations to the particularities of each 
establishment and to the economic and social environment in which it 
operates. Their ability to work out the process through which the 
enterprise comes into compliance gives them further latitude to adjust 
the code. Thus, for example, they might enforce health and safety 
standards more stringently and allow less time to come into 
compliance in a tight labor market where unemployment is low and 
jobs are plentiful than in a recession, when imposing the costs of 
compliance risks driving the firm out of business and destroying jobs.
80
 
According to Piore, the contrast with the United States’ system is 
stark.  In the United States, the narrow jurisdiction of an agency’s 
officers and agents gives little wiggle room to pick and choose which 
rules to focus on given certain market and industry conditions and how 
to compel the regulated parties to comply with the law.
81
 
A third relevant characteristic of Latin labor inspection is that the 
line agents, the labor inspectors, are professionals subject to review and 
discipline by their profession and not just by the bureaucracy for which 
they work.
82
  Professional self-regulation promotes better quality work 
and limits the chances of  capture.  In the Dominican Republic, for 
example, one of the ways that the labor inspectorate has been 
successfully reformed has been by requiring new labor inspectors to 
have law degrees.
83
  Because they are lawyers, the new labor inspectors 
are subject to review and supervision by the lawyers’ bar.  Indiscipline 
and corruption could lead to their disbarment, destroying their capacity 
to make a living as state agents or as private attorneys.
84
 
With all of this being said, Latin America is not exactly known for 
 
 79.  Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies, supra note 70, at 388. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id.  
 82.  SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 11, 15, 32. 
 83.  State of the Working World: Dominican Republic, VERITÉ, 
http://www.verite.org/SWW/DominicanRepublic (last visited June 8, 2012).  
 84.  See id. 
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its high-quality state institutions and strict adherence to the rule of law.  
What, then, has the “Latin” inspection system been able to do 
successfully in Latin America?  Let us take the case of Brazil.   
According to researcher Roberto Pires, the most successful cases of 
labor inspection in Brazil are those where inspectors “bring firms into 
compliance with the law by finding legal and/or technical solutions that 
create positive incentives for firms to improve working conditions and 
remain in compliance.”
85
    
The labor inspectorate in Brazil recently identified significant 
noncompliance with health and safety rules in the automotive industry.
86
  
In response to these findings, the inspectorate decided to follow a 
strategy which aimed to persuade auto manufacturers that making 
significant investments in health and safety implements was desirable.
87
  
For these ends, inspectors searched for and provided information to 
employers regarding the existence of cost-efficient protective 
equipment.
88
  They also identified subsidized credit for employers to 
purchase the protective machinery.
89
  As a result of such conciliatory 
and remedial, even facilitative actions for compliance, 70% of the auto-
manufacturing employers invested in the technologies.
90
  Official 
accidents were lowered by 66%.
91
 
In another regulatory area, wage and hour regulations, the Brazilian 
labor inspectorate was also able to formalize the employment contracts 
of so-called “cordeiros.”
92
  Annually in Brazil, more than 70,000 
workers are hired on a temporary basis to serve as cordeiros during what 
has become the “mega-event” of Carnival.
93
  Cordeiros are the workers 
that hold the ropes that separate the crowds watching Carnival from the 
members of dancing and music troupes participating in the event.
94
  
Given the informal employment arrangements, cordeiros were subject to 
abuse.
95
  Non-payment and underpayment of wages was common.
96
  On 
the flip side, the low quality nature of the job lent itself to poor job 
 
      85.    Pires, supra note 11, at 206. 
 86.  Id. at 209-10. 
 87.  See id. at 210-11. 
 88.  Id.  
 89.  Id. at 211. 
 90.  See id. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 208. 
 93.  Id. at 207. 
 94.  See id.  
 95.  See id. at 207-08. 
 96.  Id. at 208. 
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attachment and turnover.
97
  Many cordeiros would abandon their jobs, 
even during official working time, for better-paying work offered to 
them.
98
  Informality was bad for business and for the cordeiros. 
While both workers and employers seem to have suffered from the 
evils of informality, neither group felt compelled to formalize the 
employment relationship.
99
  On one hand, formally hiring and 
terminating the employment contracts of about 1,000 cordeiros, which, 
according to Pires, was the average number of cordeiros hired by each 
employer, was administratively challenging and costly.
100
  On the other 
hand, many workers did not want their cordeiro job to appear in their 
formal employment history
101
 because of the stigma associated with such 




The solution that the inspectorate found to resolve the double bind 
caused by informality was to target the entire Carnival industry and find 
a solution that addressed both worker and employer interests.  In 
consultation with workers and employers, the labor inspectors helped to 
create: 
[A]n alternative formal arrangement for temporary hiring – namely, a 
service provision contract [rather than a formal employment contract] 
specific to cordeiros, which [was] basically made up of clauses 
concerned with minimum daily rates, breaks, food, gloves, insurance 
against accidents, etc.  This temporary employment contract 
established basic protections for workers while giving firms a viable 
way to formalize their labour force and provide better quality service 
for their patrons . . . .
103
 
In the example of the Carnival, the inspectorate undertook a non-
punitive, compliance-based, multi-party, and participatory methodology 
to bring employers into compliance, 
104
 the combined prescriptions of 
New Governance and responsive regulation. 
However, contemporary labor inspection still has problems.  While 
there is enthusiasm over the renaissance of Latin inspection, the 
 
 97.  See id.  
 98.  Id. 
 99.  See id. at 208.  
 100.  Id.  
 101.  All employees in Brazil have a formal work history called a carteira de 
trabalho.  See id. 
 102.  See id. 
 103.  Id.  
 104.  Id. at 199.  
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resurgence of Latin inspectorates in the developing world has not 
produced the same results everywhere.
105
  Even Pires, for example, has 
identified uneven successes in Brazil.
106
  While “sticks” seldom work 
alone, toothless conciliation or remedial strategies are similarly 
ineffective.
107
  Researchers paying attention to Central American and 
Caribbean countries since the signing of the Central American and 
Dominican Republic Free Trade Act with the United States (CAFTA-
DR) likewise have noticed mixed results after the trade agreements 
imposed special work law enforcement duties on the parties.
108
 In 
Argentina, research has also noticed differing degrees of success 
determined by the role that workers have played in aiding labor 
inspectors,
109
 dovetailing with New Governance and responsive 
regulation propositions that inclusive and participatory frameworks 






IV. THE CHILEAN CASE “ON THE BOOKS” 
The case of Chile can contribute to debates regarding the utility of 
punishing versus persuading employers to comply with the work laws.  
If there is a jurisdiction in the world where punishment should be 
working properly, it is Chile.  Chile is known for its high quality 
institutions and strong rule of law.  The administrative orientation of 
work law enforcement is also strongly punitive. 
A. Rule of Law 
Some may be skeptical about lessons that could be drawn for the 
 
 105.  See SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 23-29 (detailing the 
different approaches to the labor market regulation in Central American countries such 
as Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, and Guatemala). 
 106.  See Pires, supra note 11, at 203-06. 
 107.  See id. at 204-06. 
 108.  See generally SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67. 
 109.  See Matthew Amengual, Changes in State Capacity to Respond to Labor 
Standard Violations:Enforcement in the Garment Workshops of Buenos Aires, MIT 
SLOAN SCHOOL OF MGMT. INST. FOR WORK & EMP. RES. 19 (Jan. 11, 2012), available at 
http://web.mit.edu/amengual/www/Amengual-ILOChapter-2012-01-11.pdf. 
 110.  AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 111, at 3-4 (“If we accept that sound policy 
analysis is about understanding private regulation . . . and how it is interdependent with 
state regulation, then interesting possibilities open. . . .”). 
 111.  See also EVANS, supra note 46, at 29 (discussing the importance of being 
proactive and the cooperation of state-society relations). 
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United States and others from Chile, a medium-sized, if not small, still 
developing country.  While true that Chile’s geography, population, 
culture, wealth, and many other differences only make it an imperfect 
model for almost any other developed nation, we should not easily 
disregard lessons that can be drawn from its experiences.  First, Chile is 
regarded as one of the most institutionally sophisticated states in the 
world.
112
  Not a single country in Latin America and the Caribbean 
surpasses Chile’s institutional qualities.
113
  World Bank indicators
114
 
place Chile as the Latin American country with the strongest support for 
the rule of law.
115
  Other World Bank indicators, such as regulatory 
quality and control of corruption, place Chile at the top 10th percentile 
globally.
116
  Indexes by other organizations that measure rule of law in 





 112.  Why Chile?, GOBIERNO DE CHILE: MINISTRY OF FINANCE, 
http://www.hacienda.cl/english/investor-relations-office/why-chile.html (last updated 
May 2012).  
 113.  See id. 
 114.  Daniel Kaufmann et al., The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodology 
and Analytical Issues 9 (The World Bank Dev. Research Grp., Working Paper No. 5430, 
2009) [hereinafter referred to as Daniel Kauffman, The Worldwide Governance 
Indicators].  The World Bank reports six “governance” indicators, including “rule of 
law.”  These are measured in a units ranging from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better governance outcomes.  Id.  The World Bank’s rule of law index 
measures perceptions on “the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, in particular the quality of contract enforcement, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.”  Id. at 4.   
Note, “rule of law” is a contested concept, with some analysts advocating for “thin” and 
other “thick” accounts.  Id. at 3.  “Thin” accounts of the rule are narrowly focused on the 
country’s adherence to rules, while a “thick” account is broader and attempts to consider 
higher-ordered values such as substantive justice.  Id.  In this paper, I do not take sides 
on this debate, as it is beside the paper’s thesis.  I do stress, however, that under most 
metrics of rule of law, Chile tends to come ahead.  
 115.  See Transparency and the Rule of Law in Latin America: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on the W. Hemisphere of the H. Comm. on Int’l Relations, 109th Cong. 127 
(2005), available at 
http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/intlrel/hfa21398.000/hfa21398_0f.htm. 
 116.  See Worldwide Governance Indicators: Country Data Report for CHILE, 
1996-2010, WORLD BANK INST., 5, 7, 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/c41.pdf.  
 117.  For example, the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) by the Bertelsmann 
Foundation offers a rule of law measure for developing economies that considers 
“democratization” and “market liberalization” and “evaluates reformers’ actions, 
decisions and management within a country.”  Verónica Michel, The Rule of Law: 
Definition and Measurement (2010) (unpublished memo on file with author).  The index 
is based on a 1-10 point scale, with 1 being the worst and 10 being the best score.  Id.  
According to the BTI’s survey of more than 140 developing countries in 2009, Chile 
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In terms of work law regulation and enforcement, Chile also seems 
to be at the head of the pack.  A recent report showed that Chile 
provided relatively more resources for work law regulation and 
enforcement than any Latin American country, with just more than 19.25 
inspectors for every 100,000 workers in the economy.
118
  The second 





ranked 9th with a score of 8.99.  Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), 
BERTELSMANN FOUNDATION (Mar. 22, 2012), http://www.bertelsmann-transformation-
index.de/en/bti.  Uruguay was the only Latin American country with a higher score, with 
9.25.  Id.  Another index, the Global Integrity Index (GII) measures levels of governance 
and anti-corruption trends.  Verónica Michel, The Rule of Law: Definition and 
Measurement (2010) (unpublished memo on file with author).As part of what are defined 
as “anti-corruption mechanisms” this index provides a measure of “rule of law and 
access to justice.”  Id.  Rule of law is measured by considering “legal equality, 
impartiality, and access [to justice].”  Id.  However, the GII only covers a select group of 
countries each year, raising serious difficulties for general, comparative analysis across 
time.  Id.  However, even then, the evidence strongly favors a view that Chile generally 
respects the rule of law.  In 2008, the GII measured the rule of law in five Latin 
American and Central American countries, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Ecuador and 
Nicaragua, and placed Chile at the top of the list.  Claudia Lagos Lira, Reporter’s 
Notebook: Chile, GLOBAL INTEGRITY REPORT, 
http://report.globalintegrity.org/Chile/2008/notebook (last visited June 11, 2012). 
Other rules of law indexes do not contain a measure for Chile.  These other indexes are 
the ABA’s Judicial Reform Index 
(http://www.abanet.org/rol/publications/judicial_reform_index_factors.shtml), Freedom 
House (http://www.freedomhouse.org), and the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 
(http://www.worldjusticeproject.org).  Verónica Michel, The Rule of Law: Definition and 
Measurement (2010) (unpublished memo on file with author) (describing the various, 
existing, rule of law indexes). 
 118.  SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 22.  Note, however, that 
a recent, internal DT report established that Chile counts only 1 inspector per 18.626 
workers, or 5.36 inspectors per 10,000 workers, significantly less than the amount 
reported by Schrank and Piore’s ECLAC report.  Enrique Pérez Mendoza, Desafíos para 
la profesionalización y mejoramiento de la gestión de la inspección del trabajo en Chile, 
4, 6-7 (internal DT memo, on file with author).  This possible divergence in the numbers 
is likely explained by the fact that the occupational classification of “inspector” 
(fiscalizador) is a generic category in Chile.  Many “inspectors” perform duties that have 
little to do with field inspections, from administrative to conciliation duties in the various 
DT offices.  Id. According to the internal report, the actual number of field inspectors in 
Chile in 2009 was 357.  Id.  These had to serve a total of 18,626,000 workers in the 
country.  Id. 
Nevertheless, even if Chile only counted 5.36 inspectors per 10,000 employed workers 
in the country, Chile would still be among the countries with the most labor inspectors in 
the region, behind only to Guatemala (7.53), Uruguay (5.79), Panama (5.6), and the 
Dominican Republic (5.54), followed by Costa Rica (4.66), Honduras (3.97), Argentina 
(3.05), Paraguay (2.7), Brazil (2.45), El Salvador (2.28), Mexico (1.72), Nicaragua 
(1.58), Peru (1.34), Colombia (1.24), and Ecuador (.57).  SCHRANK & PIORE, 
ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 22. 
 119.  SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 22. 
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Chile has also increased the amount of de oficio, or proactive 
inspections, since 1990, with some years counting for as much as 50% of 
all labor inspections, showing strong governmental will to proactively 
enforce the laws.
120
  Countries in the region with similar rates of 
proactive inspections only include Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic 
and Nicaragua, all of which hovered in the 41-47% range in 2004.
121
 
Finally, Chile has one of the strongest economies in the developing 
world.  In terms of gross national income (“GNI”), Chile boasted a per 
capita income figure of US $9,396 in 2008, surpassed by none other in 
the Southern Cone and only exceeded slightly by Mexico, the Latin 
American leader, with US $9,980 GNI per capita.
122
  Such has been the 
success of the Chilean economy that in 2010 Chile was admitted to the 




The case of “shiny” Chile—otherwise known as the Latin 
American “jaguar”—provides us with a case of how a well-working 
punitive labor inspectorate functions – or not. 
B. A Punitive Administrative Enforcement System 
The Chilean labor inspectorate also provides us with a case of how 
punitive enforcement works.  Different from its Latin peers, Chile’s 
labor inspection system is primarily punitive in character.  In other 
words, the Chilean labor inspectorate is not stereotypically “Latin” 
because it is punitive and not remedial or conciliatory in nature.  Hence, 
the Chilean case is not just about a likely, well-working inspectorate, but 
a punitive one, as well. 
 
 120.  César F. Rosado Marzán, Of Labor Inspectors and Judges: Chilean Labor Law 
Enforcement After Pinochet (and What the United States Can Do to Help), 54 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 497, 506 (2010).  
 121.  SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 16. 
 122.  Doing Business: Measuring Business Regulations, Economy Characteristics, 
THE WORLD BANK, 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/economycharacteristics (last 
visited June 11, 2012).  However, some Caribbean nations boast much larger GNI 
numbers, such as the Bahamas with $22,906.60, Trinidad and Tobago with $16,538.30, 
Puerto Rico with $15,629.60, and St. Kitts with 10,961.40.  Id.  However, these 
Caribbean countries are much smaller than Chile and do not really provide adequate 
comparisons.  Moreover, Puerto Rico is not even an independent nation, but a U.S. 
territory, which also makes it difficult to compare with Chile. 
 123.  Accession: OECD Welcomes Chile, Estonia, Israel and Slovenia, OECD (May 
27, 2010), http://www.oecd.org (search “Accession: OECD welcomes Chile, Estonia, 
Israel and Slovenia”). 
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1. The Labor Directorate 
The Decreto con Fuerza de Ley No. 2 of 1967 (“DFL No. 2”) is the 
law that created the Dirección del Trabajo or Labor Directorate of Chile 
(hereinafter referred to as “DT”, its Spanish acronym) as we know it 
today.
124
  The DFL No. 2 states the legal mandates for labor inspection 
in the country.
125
  Elsewhere I have detailed the basic contours of the 
DFL No. 2,
126
 but it is worthwhile to briefly review them here to better 
understand labor inspection in Chile. 
The DFL No. 2 was enacted to provide an “adequate economic and 
social development of the country,” to “scrutinize the correct application 
of the laws that guarantee the social rights of workers,” to implement the 
work laws, and to “aid the government in developing the country’s 
social policy.”
127
  In this manner, the DT was created as an integrated or 
centralized work law enforcement agency that enforces all of the 




However, the DT has an array of functions, in addition to labor 
inspection that makes the state agency’s competences quite broad.  Its 
main functions include punitive labor inspection, some marginal, 
remedial/conciliatory inspection functions, administrative interpretation 
of the law, conciliation of employment termination claims, and 
mediation of collective bargaining disputes.
129
  Other functions include 
filing specific claims in courts on behalf of workers, defending its fines 
in the labor courts when challenged by employers, providing a public 
registry (registro) of temporary employment agencies (“temp agencies”) 
and attesting documents (“fe pública”).
130
  Here I will only describe the 
functions most relevant to this article: labor inspection, marginal 
conciliatory and remedial actions, conciliation and mediation, and 
 
 124.  The first precursor of the current DT was the Oficina del Trabajo (Labor 
Office), created in 1907.  The Oficina del Trabajo was later replaced by the Dirección 
Nacional del Trabajo (National Labor Directorate) in 1924, the DT replaced the National 
Directorate in 1967.  Marcos Antonio Rodríguez Rojas, LA INSPECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO: 
SURGIMIENTO DE LA FISCALIZACIÓN LABORAL 1924-1934  26, 36-37 (Dirección del 
Trabajo 2010).   
 125.  Decreto con Fuerza de Ley No. 2, pmbl. [hereinafter DFL No. 2]. 
 126.  Rosado Marzán, supra note 120, at 500-09. 
 127.  DFL No. 2. 
 128.  CÓD. TRAB. art. 505, available at www.dt.gob.cl/legislacion/1611/articles-
59096_recurso_2.pdf.   
 129.  José Luis Ugarte Cataldo, La inspección del trabajo en Chile: vicisitudes y 
desafíos, 6 REVISTA LATINOAMERICANA DE DERECHO SOCIAL 187, 193-196 (2008). 
 130.  Id.  
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administrative interpretation of the law. 
2. Labor Inspection 
Labor inspection focuses on fines and other coercive measures, 
making labor inspection particularly punitive in Chile.  Inspectors can 
visit workplaces at any time, either de oficio—without somebody filing a 
proceeding charge against the employer—or after receiving a charge.
131
  
They can inspect the physical premises and business records of 
employers at any time of the day or night.
132
  Persons who interfere with 
the inspectors’ duties can be fined.
133
  Employers can be held directly 
and personally liable for such interferences, as well as for any moral, 
physical and material damages suffered by inspectors while performing 
their duties.
134
  Inspectors can also seek the aid of public law 
enforcement officials, including the state police (carabineros) to assist 
them in their duties.
135
 
Once inspectors find that an employer committed a violation of a 
work law, they can fine the employer, order the suspension of work 
activities, and even close a workplace if there is an immediate hazard to 




The internal rules of the inspections department of the DT further 
develop the punitive orientation of the inspectors.  According to the 
regulations pertaining to the inspectorate, known as Circular 88, 
inspectors should not assist employers on how to comply with the work 
laws.
137
  They must use labor inspection as a symbolic act that deters 
future infractions.  As the rules state: 
[I]nspection must be devoid, as a matter of principle, of any assistance 
characteristics that try to solve (supposedly) a multiplicity of concrete 
cases, one on one, with a strong conciliatory-mediating accent[.]  
Instead of obtaining more general levels of compliance with 
legislation, [assistance] presupposes that noncompliance with the law 
is due primarily to ignorance of the norm, disregarding other more 
 
 131.  DFL No. 2, art. 27. 
 132.  DFL No. 2, art. 25. 
 133.  DFL No. 2, art. 25. 
 134.  DFL No. 2. art. 25. 
 135.  DFL No. 2 art. 26. 
 136.  DFL No. 2 arts. 28, 31, 34, 38. 
 137.  Gobierno de Chile, Dirección del Trabajo, Depto.  De Fiscalización, Circular 
88, Generalidades acerca de la fiscalizacion §I(f) (July 5, 2001). 
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probable causes for noncompliance such as reduction of economic 
costs. 
In this manner, inspection does not have as a goal to address 
infractions individually, case by case, . . . but it uses these situations or 
particular realities to produce a demonstration effect in the entire social 
context.  More than resolving isolated cases, one by one, what really 
matters is to produce social scenarios where the most respect with the 
protected legality is attained. (translation by author).
138
 
Not only should inspection be devoid of compliance assistance, but 
also the rules clearly voice skepticism as to the possibility that assistance 
can ever be effective. 
The punitive perspective was not only confirmed by my 
observations in Chile and the regulations, but also by Raúl Campusano, 
the former Chief of Inspections of the DT who drafted the regulations 
cited above.
139
  According to Campusano, he drafted the regulations to 
create a “strong” inspections model in Chile.
140
  For him, compliance 
assistance programs are watered down enforcement policies used by 
“weak” agencies such as the American OSHA, an agency that in his 
opinion is entirely ineffective.
141
 
3. Marginal Conciliatory/Remedial Inspection Programs 
Notwithstanding its primary, punitive orientation, the DT has used 
more than mere fines to compel employer compliance with the country’s 
work laws.  Until the late 1990s, the DT issued “actas de instrucción” 
(writs of instruction), whereby inspectors noted employer infractions and 
gave the employer fifteen days to comply with the law before issuing a 
fine.
142
  These writs of instruction had a quasi-conciliatory or remedial 
element to them, as employers would be instructed about their violation 
and could avoid a fine by proving that they remedied the infraction and 
complied with the law within that fifteen-day period.
143
  By the late 
1990s, however, the DT discontinued writs of instruction and installed 
 
 138.  Id. 
 139.  Fieldnotes, César F. Rosado Marzán (Mar. 22, 2010). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Id. 
 142.  Interview with Maria Ester Feres, Dir. of Chile’s DT from 1994-2004 (May 13, 
2008) (notes on file with author); see also Heleen F.P. Ietswaart, Labor Relations 
Litigation: Chile, 1970-1972, 16 L. & SOC’Y REV. 625, 642–45 (1981-82) (describing an 
historical account of the informal administrative practice). 
 143.  Interview with María Ester Feres, supra note 142. 
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more formalized procedure to remedial programs including 
compliance
144
 and the “training-for-fines” program.
145
 
The compliance assistance program was formalized in 2004
146
 and 
lasted at least through 2010, when the unit in charge of administering the 
program within the DT, the Unidad Inspectiva Programada de Oficio 
(“UIPO”), was recalled by the new government administration of Chile 
that came to power that year.
147
  Directly borrowing language from the 
International Labor Organization (“ILO”), the general goal of the 
program was to develop “decent work.”
148
  It attempted to plan 
programmed, de oficio inspections to tackle systemic violations of work 
laws in the country.
149
  To do so, it would first review data previously 
collected by the DT, through inspections and complaints, to diagnose 
systematic work law infractions.
150
  Then it would design an 
intervention, which would include labor inspections, technical assistance 
to the employers, and tripartite roundtables to search for negotiated 
solutions.
151
  Through the roundtables, the UIPO attempted to promote 
situations where sanctions would not be issued if parties agreed to 




Again borrowing language from the ILO, the strategy promoted 
 
 144.  DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO, 3 ORDEN DE SERVICO (May 14, 2004), available at 
http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/articles-65345_OS_3.pdf. 
 145.  CÓD. TRAB art. 506. 
 146.  Dirección del Trabajo, 3 Orden de Servico (May 14, 2004). 
 147.  Fieldnotes, César F. Rosado Marzán (June 29, 2010).  During my fieldwork in 
Chile, various attorneys that represent employers in the country told me that they thought 
that the UIPO was eliminated because it was the office where unions had direct access to 
the Director of the DT, which made the office “political.”  Id.  The employer perception 
of pro-employee bias at the UIPO was unfortunate given that the UIPO was the office in 
charge of providing training, know-how, planning and other resources for compliance-
based, non-punitive inspections in the country.  Id. 
 148.  See Decent Work Agenda, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/decent-work-agenda/lang—en/index.htm (last 
visited June 11, 2012).  The campaign for “decent work” is derived from the 
International Labor Organization’s “Decent Work” Project.  See id.  It aims building a 
concept of work based on, “personal dignity, family stability, peace in the community, 
democracies that deliver for people, and economic growth that expands opportunities for 
productive jobs and enterprise development.” Id. It does this through job creation, 
guaranteeing rights at work, extending social protection and promoting “social dialogue” 
by “involving strong and independent workers’ and employers’ organizations [to 
increase] productivity, avoid disputes at work, and build cohesive societies.”  Id. 
 149.  Dirección del Trabajo, Orden de Servicio No. 3 (May 15, 2004). 
 150.  Id. at § III.B. 
 151.  Dirección del Trabajo, Orden de Servicio No. 3 (May 15, 2004). 
 152.  Id. 
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“social dialogue” between regulated actors, including unions and 
employers, to find solutions to problems at work and find sustainable 
methods for work law compliance. 
153
  The fine was not going to be the 
main tool, but one of various tools in the context of social dialogue to 
compel compliance with the law.  As the regulations for the program 
stated: “[a]ll strategy must, therefore, promote dialogue between the 
actors and their commitments for the solution to the problems detected 
and, if possible, maintain and provide compliance with the successes that 
have been achieved.”
154
  Social dialogue, in a particular case, could thus 
render the sought-after fruits of compliance.  The orientation of the 
program differed markedly to that of the general inspectorate, as 
established by Circular 88.
155
 
According to the former Chief of the UIPO, Pablo Leiva Mercado, 
compliance assistance was limited to unionized workplaces.
156
  With 
about 16% union density,
157
 unionized employers remain a small 
minority of employers in Chile.  The program was limited in this manner 
because Leiva Mercado and the DT at that time believed that compliance 
assistance could only be implemented when there were organized 
workers in the workplace.  Unionized employees could bring worker 
concerns to the employer and, in the absence of adequate responses by 
the employer, the union could then contact the labor inspectorate to 
intervene.
158
  In this manner, compliance assistance resembled the 
responsive regulation school’s pyramidal structure of enforcement, one 
 
 153.  See Social Dialogue, INTERNATIONAL LABOR ORGANIZATION, 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/dialogue/ (last visited on June 11, 2011).  “Social 
dialogue” is one of the International Labor Organization’s main aims for global 
workplace governance.  Id.  The organization defines “social dialogue” as:  
[A]ll types of negotiation, consultation or simply exchange of information between, or 
among, representatives of governments, employers and workers, on issues of common 
interest relating to economic and social policy. It can exist as a tripartite process, with 
the government as an official party to the dialogue or it may consist of bipartite relations 
only between labour and management (or trade unions and employers’ organizations), 
with or without indirect government involvement. Concertation can be informal or 
institutionalized, and often it is a combination of the two. It can take place at the 
national, regional or at enterprise level. It can be inter-professional, sectoral or a 
combination of all of these. 
 Id. 
 154.  GOBIERNO DE CHILE, DIRECCION DEL TRABAJIO, ORDEN DE SERVICIO No. 3 
(May 15, 2004). 
 155.  See Circular 88, supra note 138.   
 156.  Telephone interview with Pablo Leiva Mercado (Nov. 30, 2010).  
 157.  GOBIERNO DE CHILE, CENTRO DE DOCUMENTACION LABORAL, available at 
http://www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/1612/articles-99379_recurso_1.pdf (last visited 
June 11, 2012).  
 158.  Telephone interview with Pablo Leiva Mercado (Nov. 30, 2010).  
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where there is a “slippery slope that leads to a sticky end.”  The 
expectation of the DT was also that compliance assistance would 
legitimize labor unions, make them more relevant for workers and 
employers, and, therefore, promote more industrial self-regulation in 
Chile.  Compliance assistance was seen as a way out of command-and-
control and for a co-regulatory, governance scheme. 
Another program, the replacement of fines for training (hereinafter 
referred to as “fines for training”) program provides that small 
employers with nine employees or fewer can request assistance 
implementing the work laws in lieu of fines levied by a labor 
inspector.
159
  Employers must correct the behavior for which they were 
sanctioned within thirty days of the issuance of the fine.
160
  They also 
can only request such reductions in fines once a year.
161
 
The law also provides medium-sized employers with twenty-five 
employees or fewer with an alternative to the fine, but only for 
violations of an occupational health and safety rule if the employer 
requests the removal of a fine after the DT issues it.
162
  Rather than 
merely attending a course, mid-size employers must institute a program 




While some sources state that the training-for-fines program has 
been regarded as a successful program in Chile,
164
 empirical studies 
show only mildly positive results.
165
  In a study with 2004 data, 
researchers found no statistically significant results for law compliance 
for those employers who participated in the program. 
166
  However, 
stronger results could be gleaned for smaller employers.
167
 
Even if mildly effective, the program remains limited to smaller 
 
 159.  CÓD. TRAB., art. 506. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. 
 162.  Id.  
 163.  Id.  
 164.  SCHRANK & PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, supra note 67, at 15 n.3. 
 165.  Juan Chacaltana, Economic Implications of Labour and Labor-related Laws on 
MSEs: A Quick Review of the Latin American Experience 34 (Int’l Labour Office, Emp’t 
Sector, Working Paper No. 31, 2009), available at 
http://staging2.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_emp/—-
emp_ent/documents/publication/wcms_115966.pdf (last visited June 12, 2012) (citing 
LUIS MONTERO, GERHARD REINECKE, DANIELA ZAPATA: SUSTITUCIÓN DE MULTAS POR 
CAPACITACIÓN: EVALUACIÓN DE UNA EXPERIENCIA (2006)). 
 166.  Id.  
 167.  Id. 
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employers, and few of them participate in the program.
168
  It is truly a 
marginal island of compliance assistance in a sea of punishment-based 
compliance strategies.  In 2004, 1,368 employers were trained,
169
 while 
94,981 inspections were done in the same year resulting in 48,002 
fines.
170
  The number of participating employers is dwarfed by the large 
amounts of inspections and fines issued in the country.
171
  Formally non-
punitive programs, in this regard, operate at the margins of centrally 
important punitive practices.  However, as we will see below,
172
 the DT 
engages in conciliatory and remedial actions through an unsuspected 
manner –– administrative interpretations of the law that instruct the 
public about their rights and obligations under the law.
173
 
4. Conciliation and Mediation 
The DT, through its inspectors, has the authority to summon parties 
and documents in order to conciliate or settle cases regarding employee 
terminations.
174
  Conciliation is generally voluntary, meaning that the 
parties need not reach a settlement during the conciliation hearing.
175
 
Subpoenaed parties, however, must present themselves at the hearing.  
The inspector cannot formally adjudicate a case.
176
  Only labor courts 
 
 168.  See César F. Rosado Marzán, Of Labor Inspectors and Judges: Chilean Labor 
Law Enforcement After Pinochet (and What the United States Can Do to Help), 54 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 497, 504 (2010) (citing CÓD. TRAB art. 506). 
 169.  Gerhard Reinecke, Presentation at Economía Informal en Argentina, Los 
Desafíos de la Inclusión: Informalidad y políticas públicas: El caso de Chile 24 (Nov. 25, 
2009) (Power Point slides available at http://www.oit.org.ar/documentos/reinecke.pdf). 
 170.  Dirección del Trabajo, Series Estadísticas, Capítulo IV. Actividad Inspectiva, 
Cuadro 1 and 10a. 
 171.  In fact, during my seven months in Chile, I only even heard about the program 
once, and it was not even at the DT.  I heard about it when I was observing labor trials at 
a Santiago labor court.  In that case, an employee was suing an employer for an unjust 
termination.  In the testimony offered by the worker, she alleged that the employer had 
been fined by the DT for not keeping proper documentation.  The employer then rebutted 
the testimony of the employee by stating that the DT had never sanctioned him.  The 
employer was merely technically correct since after some more testimony it was 
discovered that the DT had fined the employer but then the DT replaced the fine with 
training under the program.  The discussion of the program had little to do with the 
employer’s compliance with the labor laws. 
 172.  See infra Part III.B.4. 
 173.  Rosado Marzán, supra note 120, at 501-02. 
 174.  Id. at 504 (citing DFL NO.2 art. 29). 
 175.  See id. (noting that conciliation has recently become mandatory for only wage 
and salary cases in limited circumstances).  
 176.  CÓD. TRAB., arts. 506, 507.  
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have the competence to decide termination cases in Chile.
177
  However, 
the inspector can fine any party who is summoned but fails to appear 
without just cause or who appears without the subpoenaed documents.
178
  
The conciliation hearing at the DT has also recently become mandatory 
for some categories of wage and hours cases of smaller monetary 
value.
179




5. Administrative Interpretation of the Law 
Finally, the DFL No. 2 also provides that the Director of the DT — 
its head — can determine the meaning and scope of labor legislation in 
the country
181
 so that its career servants can uniformly implement the 
law across the different regions of Chile.
182
  This type of administrative 
interpretation of the law issued by the heads of some government 
agencies of Chile is done through dictámenes.
183
  In the case of the DT, 
its Director issues the dictamen.  A dictamen directly binds all the 
officers of the administrative agency.
184
  As explained by a known 
Chilean legal scholar, however, dictámenes also informally bind private 
parties, as private parties must adapt their behavior using the dictamen as 
a guide if they want to reduce their chances of being fined or otherwise 
penalized by the government agency.
185
  While not de jure binding, 
dictámenes significantly bind parties de facto. 
 
 177.  See infra Part III.C.  
 178.  Id. at art. 30.  
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Id. at Title I(d), art. 9.  
 181.  DFL NO.2 art. 1.  
 182.  E-MAIL WITH SERGIO MEJÍA VIEDMA, PARTNER, ARTHUR, HINZPETER, PIZARRO, 
HUMÉRES & CÍA (FORMER SUB-DIRECTOR, DT 1994–2000) (2008).  
 183.  Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 130, at 191.  Professor Ugarte Cataldo explains that 
the department is entrusted with the following tasks: to determine whether labor laws are 
being enforced; establish an office; upon request of the interested party, provide advice 
on the meaning and scope of labor laws; disclose the social and technical principles of 
labor laws; supervise the functioning of union organizations in accordance with the rules 
that govern unionization; and undertake any action to prevent or resolve disputes.  Id. at 
191 n.4.  According to Professor Ugarte Cataldo, other Chilean administrative agencies 
with similar interpretative functions include the Controlaría General de la República 
(comptroller), Servicios de Impuestos Internos (treasury), Servicio Nacional de Aduanas 
(customs), and Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (financial 
regulatory agency), among others.  Id. 
 184.  Id. at 192.  
 185.  Luis Lizama, La Dirección del Trabajo: una explicación de su facutad de 
interpretar la legislación laboral chilena 59 (1998).  
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C. The DTs Relationship with Other Work Law Enforcement 
Institutions: Courts and Labor Unions 
It is important to underline that in Chile, even though the 
inspectorate is centralized at the DT, work law enforcement is not 
handled by the DT exclusively.  Courts and labor unions also play 
relevant roles.
186
  Courts are the institutions where private parties seek 
ultimate redress for violations of the labor code.  Courts adjudicate 
contractual controversies between workers and employers or between 
employers and the DT, when the employer believes that the DT has 
exceeded its authority under the law and violated constitutional 
precepts.
187
  In Chile, trial level courts that adjudicate controversies 
arising under the labor code are specialized labor courts.
188
 
The labor courts’ jurisdiction include not only contractual matters 
but also those cases and controversies related to violations of 
“fundamental rights”
189
 such as employment discrimination and unfair 




Labor inspectors cannot adjudicate matters regarding fundamental 
rights or unfair labor practices, but they can investigate the claims and 
impose administrative fines.
191
  The DT can also file a complaint in the 
courts and act as a party,
192
 in the public interest.  In other words, for 
workers to actually get a remedy related to a breach of their employment 
contract, they will have to file a complaint at the labor court.  While the 
inspectorate may fine employers for deterrent purposes and close 
dangerous workplaces, and perhaps conciliate a dispute regarding a 
termination, the courts are the proper forum for workers to seek 
 
 186.  See Jonas Malmberg, Enforcement of Labour Law, in THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
LABOUR LAW IN EUROPE: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF 15 COUNTRIES 1945-2004 (Bob 
Hepple & Bruno Veneziano eds., 2009) (standing for the proposition that comparative 
work law scholarship has consistently acknowledged the role of labor unions, courts 
(mostly specialized labor courts) and the administrative state as the three pillars of 
effective work law enforcement).  In Europe, labor law enforcement historically 
combined industrial (collective bargaining), administrative, and judicial processes. One 
of these processes may exert primacy in particular countries at particular times.  Id.; see 
also SERGIO GAMONAL C., FUNDAMENTOS DE DERECHO LABORAL 105 (2008) (offering a 
Chilean perspective on the issue). 
 187.  CÓD. TRAB., art. 420. 
 188.  CÓD. TRAB., art. 415. 
 189.  Id. at Title VII. 
 190.  CÓD. TRAB., art. 420(e). 
 191.  Id. at arts. 292, 486. 
 192.  Id.  
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personal, monetary remedies and equitable relief.  If workers cannot 
afford a lawyer to represent them, they can be referred to the Defensoría 
Laboral, a subagency that provides lawyers, free of charge, to indigent 
employees filing claims in the labor courts.
193
  Labor court decisions can 
be appealed to the appropriate Court of Appeals and thereafter to the 
Supreme Court of Chile.
194
 
Unions in Chile group themselves into federations and other supra-
union agglomerations such as centrals,
195
 but only plant-level unions 
have the right to bargain collectively for workers.
196
  By far, the 
principal labor union central of Chile is the Central Unitaria de 
Trabajadores (“CUT”), with 2,667 affiliated organizations.
197
  The 
second most important organization is the Union Nacional de 
Trabajadores (“UNT”) with only 279 affiliated organizations.
198
  Finally, 
the third most important organization is the Central Autónoma de 
Trabajadores (“CAT”) with 270 affiliated organizations.
199
  However, 
more than half of all Chilean labor unions are not affiliated to a union 
central.
200
  Out of a total of about one million organized workers in Chile 
(including the public sector), more than 600,000 are not part of a labor 
union affiliated to a central.
201
 
Private labor union density rates in Chile in 2010 stood at less than 
16%.
202
  It has remained at or near that level since the mid-1990s.
203
  The 
lack of strong protections for collective organization and bargaining 
have been blamed for that low rate, as well as for the even lower 
percentage of workers covered by a collective instrument of any kind, 
 
 193.  See Rosado Marzán, supra note 120, at 512. 
 194.  Cataldo, supra note 130, at 193-94. 
 195.  CÓD. TRAB., art. 213.  
 196.  See infra Part V.C. 
 197.  Pablo Obregón Castro, Sólo el 22% de los sindicatos del pais pertenecen a la 
CUT, Economia y Negocios, (Sept. 4, 2011), 
http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=88206. 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. 
 202.  Diego López Fernández, La ineficacia de derecho de negociar colectivamente, 
NEGOCIACIÓN COLECTIVA EN CHILE, LA DEBILIDAD DE UN DERECHO IMPRESCINDIBLE 43, 
44-46 (2010).  Numbers for 2009 and 2010 were directly obtained from Dirección del 
Trabajo, Compendio de Series Estadísticas, 1990-2010, available at 
http://www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/1612/articles-62614_recurso_1.pdf  
(last visited on June 12, 2012). 
 203.  Dirección del Trabajo, Compendio de Series Estadísticas, 1990-2010, available 
at http://www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/1612/articles-62614_recurso_1.pdf (last visited 
June 12, 2012). 
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which stood at 12% in 2008 even though union density stood at 16% in 
that same year.
204
  The negative gap between coverage and 
representation makes Chile a unique country since representation gaps 
are normally positive – more workers are covered by collective 
instruments than there are union member – as in France.
205
 
The right to strike, the right that workers have to strike without fear 
of permanently losing their employment or receive any other negative 
sanctions from the employer or the state, exists in a limited form in 
Chile.  Strikes are also highly regulated.
206
  Workers can only legally 
strike after turning down management’s final offer during a regulated 
bargaining and must begin their strike within three days after turning 
down the offer.
207
  The employer can hire replacement workers.
208
  
However, different from the United States, replacement workers in Chile 
cannot be permanent.  They can be hired only to provide the employer 
with the necessary services required during the strike.
209
 
All this said, labor unions in Chile exist for the general purpose of 
auto tutela,
210
 or self-protection.  The Labor Code establishes these self- 
protection purposes, including: representing its members in collective 
 
 204.  ENCLA 2008, Resultado de la Sexta Encuesta Laboral, 158 (2008).  The rate 
of collective bargaining between 2004 and 2008 in the private sector has been an average 
of 10.7%, excluding domestic service.  Gonzalo Durán Sanhueza, Resultados 
Económicos de la Negociación Colectiva en Chile, Fundación Sol, available at 
http://www.fundacionsol.cl/wp-content/uploads/2010/09/Ensayo_2.pdf (last visited June 
12, 2012).  The weakness of collective bargaining in Chile is also reflected in wages, 
whereas 10% of the richest earn fifty-three times more than the poorest 10%, and even 
large companies have made large gains over the years while economic growth has 
remained constant in Chile.  Id.  Wages in large firms have fallen by 18% between 1994 
and 2006.  Id.  Lack of protections for unions is also reflected in how convenient it is for 
the employer to pursue and destroy the union, as demonstrated in a study by the Labor 
Directorate of Chile on the illegal dismissal of workers and its direct impact on the 
weakening of the labor movement.  Jorge Salinero, La Destrucción del Sindicato: 
Intolerancia a un Derecho Fundamental, Cuaderno de Investigación Nº 20, Santiago, 
Departamento de Estudios, Dirección del Trabajo 97-98 (2004). 
 205.  ROGER BLANPAIN ET AL., THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: INTERNATIONAL AND 
COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 450 (Cambridge Univ. Press 
2007). 
 206.  See Chile, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, & 
Labor (Mar. 6, 2007), http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78884.htm. 
 207.  Chile – Annual Survey of Violations of Trade Union Rights, INT’L TRADE 
UNION CONFEDERATION, HTTP://SURVEY.ITUC-CSI.ORG/CHILE.HTML?LANG=EN#TABS-3 
(last visited June 29, 2012).  
 208.  Id. 
 209.  CÓD. TRAB. art. 381. 
 210.  SERGIO GAMONAL C., DERECHO COLECTIVO DEL TRABAJO 28 (2nd ed. Abeledo 
Perrot 2011); FRANCISCO J. TAPIA GUERRERO, SINDICATOS EN EL DERECHO CHILENO DEL 
TRABAJO 311 (2d ed. Abeledo Perrot 2007). 
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negotiations, enforce collective contracts,
211
 represent their members in 
the exercise of their rights under their individual employment contracts, 
if the members so desire,
212
 aid in the compliance of all workplace laws 
and social security, file complaints of violations and noncompliance to 
the adequate administrative and judicial authorities and act as parties in 
the relevant controversies, when required,
213
 among other social, 
educational, labor-management cooperation functions.
214
 
However, the legal texts do not answer if there a gap between “law 
in the books and law in practice,”
215
 as is commonly found in work law.  
How do all of these pieces fit together in practice?  Is the DT effective?  
Does punishment work?  To these questions we turn next, after 
explaining how I gathered the information reported. 
V. METHODOLOGY 
The American Bar Foundations’ 1970 report, The Legal Profession 
in the US, established that “[t]he law of the US is today largely 
embodied in, shaped by, or effectuated through the rules, regulations, 
programs and policies of governmental agencies.”
216
  This rings as true 
today as it did four decades ago.  As Robert Kagan pointed out, most of 
these rules, regulations, programs and policies, “are rarely reviewed by 
courts, or reported in newspapers, or examined by scholars.”
217
  Given 
that these agencies’ practices are “buried in filing cabinets,”
218
 and that 
most administrator’s decisions are made “informally, undramatically, 
and deep in the recesses of bureaucracies,”
219
 many American legal 
academics generally know relatively little of the real practices of 
American public administrators and how they apply the law.  In the case 
of labor regulation in Latin America, our knowledge mostly stems from 
lawyers who have focused on legal texts, not empirical evidence or the 
practice of law.
220
  Making quality, comparative scholarship is extremely 
 
 211.  CÓD. TRAB. art. 220(1).  
 212.  CÓD. TRAB. art. 220(1). 
 213.  CÓD. TRAB. art. 220(3)-(4). 
 214.  See id. at 220(5)-(12). 
 215.  Roscoe Pound, Law In Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910). 
 216.  ROBERT KAGAN, REGULATORY JUSTICE: IMPLEMENTING A WAGE-PRICE FREEZE 
IX (1980) (quoting AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION, THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE US (2nd 
ed. 1970)). 
 217.  KAGAN, supra note 216, at ix. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  Id. 
 220.  See Piore, Flexible Bureaucracies, supra note 70, at 387. 
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difficult when we have little real knowledge of the law in practice. 
Therefore, to understand labor regulation in Chile, I used an 
ethnographic research approach consisting of participant observation, 
key informant interviews and legal and journalistic document analysis.  
Participant observation lasted for 29 weeks, or about seven and a half 
months.
221 
 During most of those seven and a half months in Chile, I had 
an office space at the national headquarters of the DT, located in 
downtown Santiago.  The Director of the DT granted the office space to 
me after I formally requested the space, via letter, to perform an 
ethnographic study of the institution. 
In my downtown Santiago office, I answered to Omar, the direct 
office supervisor
222
 and to the Chief of the Research Department of the 
DT, who was interested that I share my findings once the study was 
concluded.  I was given a cubicle located in an office where five labor 
inspectors, and one supporting attorney and Omar worked.  At my 
request, Omar assigned me to labor inspections and other meetings 
undertaken by his staff.  He also scheduled labor inspections for me to 
observe outside of Santiago, with inspectors of various regional offices. 
I was able to visit workplaces with the DT inspectors about a dozen 
and a half times, and observe the manner in which the inspectors 
performed their work.  I visited workplaces located in commercial, 
industrial, transportation, and entertainment (television stations) 
establishments in Santiago.  I also visited two very large mines in the 
north of the country and one agricultural field in the central part of the 
country. 
At the DT I also observed “conciliations” settlements of unfair 
dismissals.  The conciliation hearings that I observed all took place at 
DT offices in Santiago and Concepción.  They were chaired by a labor 
inspector who heard oral evidence and reviewed documents regarding 
the alleged unfair dismissals.  I observed more than thirty such hearings 
in the time span of about three discontinuous weeks. 
Finally, during my fieldwork in Chile, I also observed labor trials at 
the labor courts of Santiago, as well as the country’s second largest city 
of Concepción, the port town of Valaparaíso, and the mining cities of 
Antofagasta and Calama.  In total I spent about two and half months 
observing hearings.  I observed hearings regarding, among other 
subjects, unfair dismissals, employment discrimination, unfair labor 
 
 221.  One week in May of 2008, ten weeks in 2009 (June–July and two weeks in 
December), and sixteen weeks in 2010 (March-April and July-August).   
 222.  Omar is the pseudonym given to the Supervisor to protect his identity. 
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practices by unions and employers, disputes over wages and hours, and 
cases regarding the revision of fines issued by the DT against employers. 
The fieldwork at the DT and the courts helped me to better 
understand the jurisdictional demarcations of the DT inspectors and the 
labor judges, the two main state actors in Chile with the ministerial 
duties to enforce the country’s work laws.  Both at the DT and at the 
labor courts I established close, collegial relationships with a handful of 
labor inspectors and judges who served as my key informants including 
Omar.  I interviewed these key informants formally and informally 
throughout my fieldwork.  Before and/or after inspections of trials, I also 
was able to interview labor inspectors, judges and some of the lawyers 
for workers and employers involved in the various cases. 
Finally, I did significant document collection and review, including 
studying the Labor Code, parts of the Civil Procedural Code, the DFL 
No. 2 and internal DT regulations and manuals cited herein. I read the 
main newspapers, El Mercurio, La Nación, La Segunda, and La Tercera 
on a regular basis to follow stories related to labor inspection and work 
law in the country.  Some of the stories widely discussed in the press, 
such as the 2010 mining incident and the 2008 Codelco cases regarding 
subcontracting, are discussed herein. 
I recorded my observations as daily “jottings”
223
 during the day in 
pocket-sized reporter notebooks.
224
  Almost every evening I spent at 
least two hours passing down my “jottings” into more formal notes in 
my computer.  At certain times during my fieldwork, I also wrote short 
memos to myself.  These memos served as preliminary analyses of my 
data where I tried to make sense of what I was experiencing and 
establish themes observed in my fieldwork.  In total, I collected 347 
pages of mostly single-spaced, typed notes. 
Collecting data for this study through participant observation, 
interviews and document materials helped me to validate or invalidate 
some of my judgments made during my daily observations, or perform 




 223.  “Jottings translate to-be-remembered observations into writing on paper as 
quickly remembered notes about actions and dialogue.  A word or two written at the 
moment or soon afterwards will jog the memory later in the day and enable the 
fieldworker to catch significant actions and to construct evocative descriptions of the 
scene.”  ROBERT M. EMERSON ET AL., WRITING ETHNOGRAPHIC FIELDNOTES 19-20 
(1995).   
 224.  For more detail on fieldwork note taking and methodology see id. at 17-38. 
 225.  BRYAN S. TURNER, THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 638 (2006). 
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VI. THE CHILEAN MODEL “IN PRACTICE” 
“I like military governments, they keep everyone straight.” 
Businesswoman overheard by author during flight to Chile, March 
2010. 




 Labor Inspector, responding to my comment regarding the 
above-stated quote. 
While the “Latin” work law regulation and enforcement 
administrative system is oriented towards remediation and conciliation 
of issues, Chile’s is punitive.  The quotations above capture the attitude 
against employers that I noticed among many labor inspectors.
227
  
Inspectors employ a variety of sanctions and punishment tools to compel 
employer compliance with the country’s work laws.  However, 
punishment fails to work well when employers resist and mobilize other 
institutional players such as courts and other ministries against the 
inspectorate.  This said, the DT seems to use some remedial tools 
effectively, particularly the dictamen.  Although merely an 
administrative legal interpretation of the labor code, dictámenes are 
sometimes used as a persuasive tool for work law compliance.
228
  
Evidence points towards the need to continue to experiment with such 
strategies.  Including civil society in the regulatory and enforcement 
processes should also prove effective. 
A. A First Strength?: Fine for Everything 
When the inspector reaches the workplace, she generally identifies 
 
 226.  Nato is the pseudonym given to one of the labor inspectors I regularly 
interacted with in Chile. 
 227.  The sarcasm in the inspector’s response when I told him what I overheard the 
businesswoman say also captures the tone of the public discourse regarding the conflicts 
between employers and the DT under the administration of the Concertación (1990-
2010), where employers were depicted having been pro-dictatorship and right wing, and 
the DT and labor advocates opponents of that dictatorship; pro-Concertación and pro-
DT. 
 228.  See César F. Rosado Marzán, Of Labor Inspectors and Judges: Chilean Labor 
Law Enforcement After Pinochet (and What the United States Can Do to Help), 54 ST. 
LOUIS U. L.J. 497, 504 (2010). 
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herself as a labor inspector, asks the guard or other person at the gate or 
entrance of the workplace to take her to their manager or supervisor, and 
then informs the manager that she is there do a labor inspection.  
Usually, the labor inspector does not state what she came to inspect — 
health and safety, or payment of wages, for example.  Simply, she tells 
the employer to provide her with records, usually attendance records, 
internal health and safety rules, labor contracts and payment stubs for all 
the employees or a group of them, among other records and documents 
that the employer must keep. While the employer obtains the documents, 
the inspector requests to speak with the union representatives, if any, the 
health and safety committee members
229
 and/or with individual 
employees, or simply starts walking inside the workplace interviewing 
individual employees, taking notes about possible violations that are 
perceptible to the naked eye, such as lack of safety signs or expired fire 
extinguishers and other health and safety equipment. 
Meetings with workers usually concern specific issues related to the 
original complaint filed at the DT or policy guiding a proactive 
inspection.  Inspectors also use worker meetings to learn if there are any 
other grievances that the workers may have.  Inspectors also tend to ask 
about other issues outside those in the original complaint, if a complaint 
motivated the inspection.  They may ask workers if they have any 
specific gripes or complaints that they would want to air at that moment.  
The inspector takes notes and anything that she hears or sees in violation 
of the law may form the basis of a fine. 
At meetings with the union, inspectors usually discuss the same 
topics as those conferred in meetings with individual employees.  
Meetings with the health and safety committee
230
 focus on the 
formalities: Has the health and safety committee met?  Where are the 
minutes (that are legally required to be on file)? Who has met? All of 
these questions try to get at the formal requisites for health and safety 
committees at each workplace in Chile. 
When the inspector finally meets with the employer representative 
to inspect the books and other documents, she may disclose the main 
reason why she visited the workplace, although seldom will she say who 
 
 229.  The health and safety committees (comités paritarios de hygiene y seguridad) 
must be established by the employer in any workplace with more than twenty-five 
workers.  See Chile Law 16.744 of 1968.  They are composed of three worker 
representatives and three employer representatives.  Their incumbency lasts for two 
years.  See Chile Decreto Supremo No. 54. 
 230.  Every workplace with twenty-six workers or more must have a workplace 
health and safety committee (comité paritario).  Chile Law No. 16.744 of 1968, art. 66.  
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filed the complaint if the visit was triggered by a complaint.  She will 
then inspect the books and will likely fine for incomplete records and 
any other violations noted during her visit. Sometimes, fines totally 
unrelated to the violations that the inspector initially went to inspect are 
the ones that most “bite.”  It also seems that inspectors use this 
discretionary power to fine “for everything” strategically. 
This strategy of fining for unrelated violations is reminiscent of the 
United States Federal Bureau of Investigations and the Attorney 
General’s strategies to catch the mob.
231
  Those officers had a difficult 
time breaking organized crime until they devised an alternative route to 
convict the criminals – forget the murders and other violent crimes 
where no witnesses could be produced.  Rather, catch the mob through 
tax evasion.
232
  The strategy was to get the criminals through unrelated 
charges. 
There is nothing necessarily illegal in using such circuitous routes 
to meet the organizational goals of an administrative agency.  These 
types of innovations can be classified as “judicial” modes of rule 
application.  Robert Kagan originally coined this term.  Judicial modes 
of rule application: 
[C]alls for a two-step method of rule application.  The decision maker 
is expected first to “look backward” to preexisting rules (as 
conventionally interpreted in the system) to find the one applicable to 
the case at hand. Secondly, the decision maker should “look forward” 
to assess the consequences of applying the literally applicable rule or 
each arguably applicable rule.  He must ensure that the result of 
applying the literally applicable rule “makes sense” in terms of 
existing public policy and conventional notions of fairness.
233
 
According to Kagan, the judicial mode is the expected and 
desirable way that public administrators should make sense of mandated 
rules and seeks compliance with overall goals of their agency.
234
  It helps 
the agency attain its original goals – to “catch the crooks” – without 
altering the standards and rules given to the administrators to reach that 
goal. 
In Chile, the general jurisdiction of labor inspectors enables them to 
 
 231.  See D. Larry Crumbley & Nicholas Apostolou, America’s First (and Most 
Fearless) High-profile Forensic Accountant, THE VALUE EXAMINER, Sept./Oct. 2007, at 
16-18.   
 232.  See id. 
 233.  KAGAN, supra note 217, at 91. 
 234.  Id. 
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use similar strategies when they do not have the legal authority or other 
capacities to fine an employer for a specific infraction or to otherwise 
compel it to comply with a particular rule.
235
  For example, in Chile, 
employers can only subcontract workers to perform very specific jobs: 
the tasks of an employee in a temporary leave; for extraordinary events 
of the employer, such as the organization of a conference; for new and 
specific projects; during the initial days of a new enterprise; when 
demand suddenly and temporarily increases; and “urgent” tasks.
236
  
However, under some controversial Supreme Court cases in Chile, a 
labor inspector cannot officially determine whether an employer legally 
or illegally has subcontracted a worker.
237
  Only courts can make those 
adjudications because they require the interpretation of contractual 
terms. Contracts are constitutionally protected in Chile, so only courts of 
law can interpret contractual terms, not street level bureaucrats on the 
beat, such as labor inspectors.
238
 
However, some labor inspectors attempt to innovate in order to 
enforce the law albeit without clear guidelines on how to do so.  
Inspectors fine employers for the unrelated infraction of “informality” 
and other similarly unrelated infractions to enforce the anti-
subcontracting law. 
Informality generally includes fining employers for not producing 
an array of documents, such as employment contracts and attendance 
records that employers must always have on file, in the premises, and 
 
 235.  César F. Rosado Marzán, Of Labor Inspectors and Judges: Chilean Labor Law 
Enforcement After Pincochet (And What the United States Can Do To Help), 54 SAINT 
LOUIS U. L. J. 497, 518 (2010). 
 236.  CÓD. TRAB. art. 183-Ñ. 
 237.  Supreme Court of Chile Rol. Nos. 877-2008, 953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008, 
1073-2008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 1076-2008, 1150-2008, May 12, 2008.  See also, 
Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 129, at 188 (2008).  Conservative scholarship of the 
dictatorship era promoted a narrow view of administrative adjudicatory power, taking the 
position that only courts have “jurisdictional” authority, not administrative agencies.  
According to this scholarship, administrative agencies, different from courts, lack 
independence and impartiality.  Therefore, when administrative agencies judge matters 
regarding “facts, conduct or behavior,” that can affect the “patrimony,” “honor and 
prestige” of a person, because they lack such independence and impartiality, they act as 
illegal “special commissions”—a sort of Kangaroo Court—under the Chilean 
constitution.  Eduardo Soto Klos, El Recurso De Proteccion: Origenes, Doctrina y 
Jurisprudencia 114-115 (1981).  This narrow view of administrative adjudications has 
traction in Chile, albeit not without prominent critics.  See Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 
129, at 196-203. 
 238.  Supreme Court of Chile Rol. Nos. 877-2008, 953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008, 
1073-2008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 1076-2008, 1150-2008, May 12, 2008.  Eduardo 
Soto Klos, Recurso De Proteccion: Origenes, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia 114-115 
(1981).  
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ready to be viewed by inspectors.  In some of my visits, inspectors tried 
to compel employer-principals to stop the practice of illegal 
subcontracting by requesting copies of contracts between the employer-
principal and the subcontractor (agent) that had directly hired the 
employees.  When the principal failed to produce the requested 
contracts, and many times they were not produced because 
subcontractors are many times informal agents, inspectors proceeded to 
fine the principal and the subcontractor for “informality” on grounds that 
they lacked written contracts specified by law.
239
  Such fines are capped 
at 5 Unidades Tributarias Mensales (“UTMs”)
240
 per month, or about 
US $380 (more than a Chilean minimum wage, which today stands at 
Chile $182,000
241
 or US $360) per worker.  These fines could add up 
when the employer had dozens or hundreds of workers without formal 
contracts.  In this manner, the punitive orientation, when coupled by the 
generalist powers of the inspectorate – they can fine for “anything”—
provides the inspectorate with leverage to use against employers who 
may be violating a particular law egregiously. 
There is no hard data that can help us establish whether fining for 
unrelated infractions works or not in Chile.  However, we can see how in 
particular cases it could help inspectors coerce an employer into 
complying with the law.  This coercion, however, could also support a 
culture of resistance against the labor inspectors, as we will see below in 
Section VII. 
B. A Second Strength?: Fining to “Conciliate” 
In addition to inspecting workplaces, as stated above, labor 
inspectors in Chile can conciliate individual employee termination cases 
where the employees allege an unfair dismissal.  Under Chilean law, if 
employers cannot justify a worker’s termination under one of the various 
causes for terminations,
242
 they have to pay severance pay equaling one 
 
 239.  Under Chilean law, all employers must provide employees with written 
contracts.  CÓD. TRAB. art. 9.  Failure to do so makes the employer liable to fines.  Id. 
 240.  A UTM literally means a Monthly Tax Unit. See Chile Decreto Ley Nº 830 
Sobre Codigo Tributario, art. 8.  It is a measure that is monthly adjusted for inflation 
used by the Chilean treasury (Hacienda) to stipulate taxes, fines and other.  See id.  One 
UTM is worth Chile $ 38,557.00, or US $76.25.  Five UTMs were thus worth about US 
$ 381.25. (Currency converted  using the American Express currency calculator at 
http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic (last visited June 12, 2012). 
 241.  DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO, PORTAL INSTITUCIONAL, http://www.dt.gob.cl (last 
visited June 12, 2012). 
 242.  An employment contract terminates – which means, without right for severance 
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month of pay for every year worked by the employee, for a maximum 
payment equaling eleven months of wages. 
Conciliations normally take place in hearing rooms specially 
arranged for such purposes in DT offices.  There are conciliation offices 
across the Chilean national territory.  During my approximately three 
weeks of conciliation observations, procedures were almost always 
identical.  Offices opened early in the morning, at or around 8 a.m.  By 
then, there already was a rather long line of people (perhaps with two to 
three dozen people) waiting outside the offices of the DT, many of 
whom were attending conciliation, or settlement, of employment 
termination cases.  In the Santiago offices, which are likely the largest 
ones in the country, there were fifteen inspectors performing 
conciliations each day.  Each inspector was scheduled to hear about 
eight cases per day, for a total of 120 cases handled daily by that 
Santiago office. Each hearing was scheduled for fifty-five minutes.
243
  
The workload and quality of the workplace of the inspectors was similar 
in other cities, such as Concepción, where I also sat in conciliations. La 
Serena and Antofagasta had similar offices but I did not sit in 
conciliations in those cities even though I did visit the installations. 
It is important to underline that in Chile labor courts have exclusive 
jurisdiction over the adjudication of these controversies, but employees 
may request that the DT conciliate the dispute extra-judicially prior to 
filing a complaint in court.  Even though the conciliation is formally 
voluntary, the DT will subpoena the employer to a hearing.  The 
employer not only has to appear at the hearing, but also must present 
pertinent documents such as employment contracts, assistance records, 
payment stubs, proof of health and pension contribution payments, and 
 
– under mutual agreement of the parties, resignation of the employee, death of the 
employee, end of the term of employment under the contract, end of the work or service 
for which the employee was required, and for Acts of God or force majeure.  CÓD. TRAB. 
art. 159.  The employer may also terminate the employee without requirement to pay 
severance under one of the following causes: misconduct of grave character including 
probity in the performance of his duties, sexual harassment, illegal acts taken against the 
employer or coworker, insults made against the employer, and immoral conduct by the 
employee that affects the employer.  Other reasons include: competitive practices against 
the employees that could have been prohibited by the employer in the employment 
contact; two missed absences without just cause by the employee, or on two Mondays in 
a month, or a total of three days in the same amount of time, or the unjustified absence 
without prior motive that gravely perturbs the activities of the employee; abandonment 
of the job by the employee; reckless acts or omissions that affect the security and 
functioning of the employer or the security or activity of the workers; intentional torts 
against the property of the employer; and grave noncompliance with the contractual 
obligations.  CÓD. TRAB. art. 160. 
 243.  Fieldnotes, César F. Rosado Marzán (June 15, 2009). 
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other documents. 
While the employer need not reach an agreement with the 
employee, sometimes the inspectors push them to do so through the use 
of fines.  The inspectors that I worked with told me that when they 
performed conciliations, they would fine employers at the hearing in 
order to compel a settlement if they thought that the employer had 
broken the law.
244
  I actually observed one inspector do this during my 
observations in Chile.  The case related to the earthquake that shook the 
country in February of 2010.  The employee of a furniture store alleged 
that she was fired unfairly after the earthquake.  She alleged that the 
employer terminated her even though the furniture store was going to 
reopen with many of the former employees.
245
 
The employer claimed that the termination was legal and did not 
require severance pay under Article 159(6) of the labor code, force 
majeure,
246
 given that his store had been damaged and that he had to 
rebuild his business from the ground up. 
Rather than merely reconciling the interests in both sides –
conciliating-, the inspector went into legal reasoning and “held” for 
employee. The inspector told the employer that under a very recent and 
public dictamen issued by the Director of the DT, the earthquake could 
not be used as grounds for alleging force majeure unless the business 
had been totally destroyed.  Force majeure applied only to unforeseeable 
events.  Chile was a highly seismic country and the earthquake was 
foreseeable. Since the business was not totally destroyed, because it was 
going to reopen, force majeure did not excuse the employer from 
making the severance payment.  Under the law, the inspector said that 
the employer had to keep his employees on the payroll or terminate them 
with severance pay.  The employer should have foreseen the risk of 
paying severance as a result of the calamity.  If making such payments 
was too onerous for the employer, he should have purchased insurance 
for earthquake damages, as many other employers had done in Chile.
247
 
Once the employer verbalized his disapproval of the inspector’s 
determinations, the inspector requested from the employer the 
employment contract of the employee, proof that he had made all legal 
payments to the employee, and the assistance record.  The employer did 
not bring any of the documents because he thought that the meeting was 
“just conciliation” – a voluntary settlement driven by the reconciliation 
 
 244.  Fieldnotes, César F. Rosado Marzán (June 25, 2009). 
 245.  Fieldnotes, César F. Rosado Marzán (Apr. 28, 2010). 
 246.  COD. TRAB. art. 159(6). 
 247.  Fieldnotes, César F. Rosado Marzán (Apr. 28, 2010). 
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of conflicting viewpoints.  Almost as to give material effect to her 
informal adjudication to compel a settlement, the inspector proceeded to 
tell the employer that she would fine him for lacking the requested 
paperwork.  The fines would be steeper than the amount of money 
claimed by the worker.
248
 
The employer became quite upset and said, “This government 
provides zero support to employers.”  He further mentioned that the 
“inflexibility” of work laws in Chile was a real problem.  The inspector 
was unmoved.  In total, she was going to fine the employer 30 UTMs, or 
about Chile $1.14 million (about US $2,300).  Because the worker was 
only requesting Chile $618,000 in severance payments, or about US 
$1,240, the employer paid the alleged debt to the worker and settled the 
case, but not without making further protestations.
249
 
 Even though inspectors cannot decide liability in termination cases, 
the threat of fines by the inspector was not illegal.  A particular 
regulation of the DT, Circular No. 125 of December 17, 2008, gives the 
inspector authority to fine during the conciliation process.  With 
language much different than Circular 88,
250
 Circular No. 125 stated that 
effective public administration requires “discretion” and “flexibility” to 
solve particular cases.  As the regulation states: “The administrative 
authority enjoys certain discretion to exercise greater flexibility . . . to 
attain more efficient administration in benefit of the users of the 
[conciliation] system . . . .” (translation by author).
251
 
The regulation thereafter states that inspectors can fine employers 
using their discretion when conciliating individual termination cases.  In 
determining whether to issue fines, the inspectors must consider the 
results of the process (whether conciliation was reached or not) and 
whether or not the employer was going to correct infractions.
252
  
Apparently, rules to conciliate termination cases follow a very different 
philosophy than those regarding general labor inspection. 
It is important to underline that my observation regarding using 
fines to force conciliations was not unique. Not only had other inspectors 
told me that they did this in the past, but in 1970-72 Heleen F.P. 
Ietswaart, a Yale SJD student doing dissertation work in Chile regarding 
labor courts and labor inspection in Chile, reported that labor inspectors 
 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Id. 
 250.  See Circular 88, supra note 137. 
 251.  Dirección del Trabajo, Departamento Jurídico, Unidad de Conciliación 
Individual, Circular No. 125 § 1.12. 
 252.  Id. 
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would informally adjudicate cases even if the labor courts had the formal 
adjudicatory functions.
253
  Inspectors exerted all the authority they could 
muster to compel employers to settle cases at the DT when they thought 
that the employer had broken the law.
254
 
Fining during conciliations is legal, even if harsh, and apparently 
has a long tradition in Chile.  Inspectors follow the letter of the law, and 
help the inspectors obtain the DT’s objectives – compel compliance with 
the country’s work laws.  However, fining for unrelated infractions is 
not the type of flexibility advocated by students of Latin labor 
inspection, where the inspectors target particularly problematic law-
breakers and tailor the rules to the particular circumstances of the 
regulated parties.  To the extent that these inspectors’ discretion provides 
them with flexibility, it is only to punish employers into complying with 
existing rules. 
The “pro-worker” environment that some employers and their 
representatives faced at these conciliations was cause of protest of 
employer representatives that I interviewed.  In this particular case 
regarding the earthquake, the employer constantly looked at me seeking 
sympathy.  In another conciliation where an employee failed to show up 
to work without providing notice, the labor inspector attempted to 
persuade the employer to settle the case, albeit without making any legal 
interpretations.  The lawyer told me that the inspectors readily sided with 
the workers and rarely, in his estimation, applied the law.
255
  Even if this 
management attorney’s perceptions were incorrect, his words showed 
suspicion of labor inspectors.  In fact, on more than one occasion I saw 
employers so upset about the conciliation process that they preferred to 
pay fines and face the likelihood of a lawsuit than pay workers who, in 
their judgment, were terminated for cause.
256
 
C. Maybe a Third Strength?: Simply Being a Nuisance 
One particular way that labor inspectors, consciously or not, put 
pressure on employers is by being a stone in an employer’s shoe.  
Generally speaking, employers seldom desire anyone entering their 
workplace to challenge their authority and halt or slow production.  
However, this is exactly what the labor inspectors do when they enter 
 
 253.  Heleen F.P. Ietswaart, The Handling of Dismissal Grievances in Chile: A Socio 
Legal Study, 273 (1977) (unpublished dissertation on file with author). 
 254.  Id. at 138. 
 255.  Fieldnotes, César F. Rosado Marzán (June 24, 2009). 
 256.  Fieldnotes, César F. Rosado Marzán (June 25, 2009). 
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the workplace.  They become a nuisance for the employer when they 
request that the employer produce records, provide time and space to 
speak with the employees, and perform ocular inspections of the entire 
workplace.  This “nuisance card” also seems perfectly legal and helps 
inspectors attain the agency’s goal of compelling general compliance 
with the work laws. 
I observed a particularly telling example of the “nuisance card” in 
one inspection of a retail store’s consumer credit division.  I 
accompanied the inspector at about 5 p.m., or at closing time, to make a 
significant information request to the employer related to alleged illegal 
changes made to the employment contracts of the employees.  We 
walked to the workplace in downtown Santiago and asked the human 
resources manager of the credit division to provide copies of the 
personnel files of his employees, including the labor contracts.  The 
manager asked, “For which ones, we have more than one hundred 
employees.”  The labor inspector responded, “For all!”  The human 
resource manager was upset at the request since he was about to go 
home when the inspector arrived.  He now had to photocopy hundreds, if 
not thousands of pages for the inspector.  He called his secretary to help 
him, but she had been called by an executive to serve coffee and 
refreshments, so she could not help him.  Therefore, the human resource 
manager was all but happy with the request. 
This “nuisance card” that I detail had also been observed by Heleen 
Ietswaart in the 1970s, when she did a study similar to mine.
257
  Then, 
she recounted that, 
In addition, it should be emphasized that the enforcement power of the 
Inspectorate goes beyond impositions of fines.  A finally enforceable 
fine is, after all, not a very strong weapon.  But the inspectorate 
disposes over something better: the hassle.  Labor inspectors may 
interrupt work, investigate books, summon people to their office, and 
initiate court proceedings. 
258
 
What I call here “the nuisance card,” is exactly the same 
phenomenon as “the hassle” that Iestwaart noted in her study. Inspectors 
can be just one big and expensive “pain in the neck.” 
I did not stay in Chile long enough to observe the results of the 
matter detailed above. Without knowing the results, the case still shows 
that at least some labor inspectors use their discretion to innovate within 
 
 257.  Ietswaart, supra note 142, at 138. 
 258.  Id. 
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the boundaries of a punishment orientation to seek work law 
compliance.  But while discretion gives the inspector some leeway to 
punish employers into compliance, the punishment orientation does not 
seem to enable them to devise ways of adapting the regulations to 
particular circumstances that make compliance “good for business” as 
traditional Latin inspection is supposed to do.  Employers need to 
comply or risk some sort of punishment, plain and simple. Nobody likes 
nuisances and hassles.  As we will see below, such adversarial 
relationships do foment a culture of resistance against the work law 
enforcers. Such a culture can be detrimental to law compliance. 
VII. THE UNDERBELLY: EMPLOYERS RESIST, INSPECTORS ROUT, AND 
WORKERS SUFFER 
Punishment may sometimes help inspectors obtain leverage to 
compel employers to comply with the work laws.  However, some 
inspectors also told me that they think that fining is not sufficient to 
compel compliance with the law.  Some inspectors told me that some 
employers simply choose to pay the fine and remain noncompliant.  In 
fact, the human resource manager of a large mine that I inspected in 
Chile told me that his firm made so much money, over one billion U.S. 
dollars in pure profits each year, that fines were meaningless to its 
bottom line.
259
  Other employers fail to comply and then challenge the 
fine administratively and judicially to get it removed or substantially 
lowered.  In this manner, labor inspectors note what social-legal scholars 
have also realized: that resource-rich actors tend to use the legal system 
to persuade adjudicators of the correctness of their actions, creating a 




As a result of the insufficiency of the fine itself as a deterrent tool, 
sometimes inspectors attempt to threaten with a fine, rather than issue it 
on the spot, as they are required to do under the law, to compel 
compliance with the law.  The law does not provide inspectors, 
generally, with the right to threaten with a fine.
261
  Especially ever since 
the DT eliminated the practice of the writs of instruction, inspectors have 
 
 259.  Fieldnotes, César F. Rosado Marzán (July 23, 2009). 
 260.  See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come out Ahead: Speculations 
on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974) (analyzing how litigation 
can be “redistributive”). 
 261.  Circular 88, supra note 138, at § II.5.4.8. 
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to fine immediately once the violation has been noted.
262
 In this manner, 
threats are unauthorized uses of discretion.  According to Professor 
Robert Kagan, unauthorized discretion is when administrators value goal 
attainment but ignore the rules mandated by law to attain such goals.
263
  
Administrators using unauthorized discretion focus on producing the 
results they esteem are mandated by law without regard to the rules 
provided to reach those results.
264
  In Chile, while many, if not most 
unauthorized threats may go unrecorded and unnoticed, some are aired 
by employers and challenged.  Sometimes, such challenges result in 




Zealot inspectors may also use their “big stick” — suspension of 
work or workplace closure to — incapacitate the employer.  This “big 
stick” may create the deterrent effect sought.  However, work 
suspensions and plant closings may also trigger employer resistance 
through the mobilization of legal and extra-legal resources.  In some 
instances, employer resistance effectively neutralizes the actions of the 
inspectorate. 
As we will see below, both unauthorized uses of discretion and 
incapacitation — suspending production or closing the workplace — 
may result in opposition that then compels the inspectors to essentially 
“give up.”  In my fieldwork, labor inspectors “gave up” through 
legalistic enforcement of the law.  As Professor Robert Kagan has also 
described, legalism implies that regulators strictly apply existing rules 
without regard to whether or not results make sense with the agency’s 
goals.
266
  In Chile, some legalistic enforcement of the rules also comes 
close to “retreatism,” another term used by Professor Kagan to describe 
administrative action.  Retreatism implies that administrators do not 
respect the official goals and rules mandated for the agency at all.
267
  
They stopped enforcing the law. 
Unauthorized discretion, legalism, and retreatism, spurred by 
employer resistance, form what I here call the “underbelly” of the 
Chilean DT.
268
  Unauthorized discretion and legalism coexist with 
 
 262.  Id. 
 263.  KAGAN, supra note 216, at 92-96. 
 264.  Id. at 92-96. 
 265.  See Rosado Marzán, supra note 120, at 510. 
 266.  KAGAN, supra note 216. 
 267.  Id. at 94-95. 
 268.  The term “underbelly” has been inspired by what sociologist Erving Goffman 
has called the “underlife” of an organization, where informal practices contradict the 
expected and formally defined practices of the organization. See ERVING GOFFMAN, 
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effective and legitimate judicial innovations for work law enforcement 
as discussed earlier.  Altogether, the DT has two sides created by its 
punitive orientation: a front of “tough enforcement,” and a soft 
underbelly where noncompliance is rampant as a result of effective 
employer resistance. 
A. Resisting Illegal Threats 
The Chilean labor inspector may issue fines on the spot, by law.
269
  
Inspectors cannot order employers to actually comply with the law.
270
  
However, while Chilean law provides that an inspector issue fines as the 
main tool of compliance compulsion, the inspector has discretion to 
determine the relative gravity of the infraction and monetary value of the 
fine.
271
  In this manner, the Chilean labor inspector, just as any other 
“street-level bureaucrat,” has discretion “in determining the nature, 




Notwithstanding inspector discretion, the DT attempts to establish 
rules to limit it.  These are contained in an internal regulations document 
called Circular 88, a sprawling document with more than 173 legal-sized 
pages in ten-point font.
273
  Appendixes 6 and 7 of Circular 88 — which 
state the rules to consider when applying sanctions and typify infractions 
and possible fines — are 43 pages long.
274
  The rules are so voluminous 
that inspectors, as “street-level bureaucrats,” have no choice but to 
invoke them selectively and pragmatically.
275
  Sometimes, inspectors do 
not even fine.  Rather, they threaten employers in order to meet their 
ministerial goal of enforcing the work law.  This is crass abuse of 
discretion. 
 
ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES 
304-05 (1961).  The underlife stems from “habitual arrangement[s] by which a member 
of an organization employs unauthorized means, or obtains unauthorized ends, or both, 
thus getting around the organization’s assumptions as to what he should do and get and 
hence what he should be,” and “[t]hese practices together comprise what can be called 
the underlife of the institution, being to a social establishment what an underworld is to a 
city.”  Id. at 189, 199 (emphasis in original).  
 269.  See Rosado Marzán, supra note 120, at 502. 
 270.  See id.  
 271.  See Circular 88, supra note 137, at § II.5.4.8, Anexo VI-VII; see also CÓD. 
TRAB. art. 506-07; DFL No. 2, arts. 25, 30, 32, 34. 
 272.  LIPSKY, supra note 68, at 13. 
 273.  See generally Circular 88, supra note 137. 
 274.  Circular 88, supra note 137, at Anexos VI –VII. 
 275.  LIPSKY, supra note 68, at 14. 
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But threats do not always work.  As threats are essentially 
unauthorized uses of discretion, they may even backfire leading the 
agency to revert to legalistic enforcement of the law.  For example, in a 
recent high profile case regarding subcontracting, employers of the 
mining industry, among them Codelco, the state-owned mining company 
that owns most mines in Chile, complained to the Supreme Court of 
Chile that the DT illegally adjudicated contractual controversies and 
threatened them with fines.
276
 
It all started when the DT attempted to compel Codelco to hire 
5000 subcontracted employees that the DT alleged had been illegally 
subcontracted.
277
  Codelco and a number of private contractors filed a 
recurso de protección, or writ of protection, in court against the DT 
alleging that the DT violated its constitutional rights by instructing it to 
hire 5000 workers.
278
  Codelco and a number of private contractors 
alleged that DT did not have the authority to adjudicate contractual 
disputes including those related to the subcontracting arrangements.
279
  
The challenges against the DT were first filed in various Courts of 
Appeals, where recursos de protección must be filed, and all but one of 
those cases was held in favor of Codelco and the other plaintiffs.
280
 
When all the cases reached the Supreme Court and were 
consolidated for review, the Supreme Court decided that the DT had 
violated the constitutional rights of Codelco and its contractors, 
including the right of persons to be judged by a court rather than “special 
commissions,” the right to freely make labor contracts, the right to 
engage in legal economic activities, and the right to private property.
281
  
Moreover, the court determined that the DT had exceeded its jurisdiction 
by adjudicating (calificar) contractual matters, something reserved only 
to the authority of the courts.
282
  Finally, the Supreme Court deemed the 
actions of the DT arbitrary and illegal because the DT did not allow the 
subcontractors to participate in the proceedings that led to the order that 




 276.  See generally Rosado Marzán, supra note 120, at 515-17. (discussing the 
Codelco decisions from 2008). 
 277.  Id. at 515. 
 278.  Id. 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  Id. at 515-17. 
 281.  Corte Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 12 mayo 2008, Rol de la 
causa: 877-2008, 953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008, 1073-2008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 
1076-2008, 1150-2008. 
 282.  Id. 
 283.  In a concurring opinion, one justice agreed with the majority’s result, reasoning 
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The case was widely reported in the media and discussed in the 
country’s editorials.  Many of those opinions stated that the DT had 
suffered a huge setback and, given that the dispute included three 
government players, the DT, Codelco and the Supreme Court, it reported 
that the government was “divided” as a result of these decisions.
284
  
After those decisions, DT leaders decided not to enforce the 
subcontracting law.  Heads of the DT during that period told me that the 
DT could not continue to be seen in constant conflict with other 
government and state actors such as Codelco and the Supreme Court.  
Therefore, the DT had to take a low profile regarding subcontracting.  It 
would limit its enforcement of the subcontracting law merely to stating 
factual matters in inspection reports and leaving it up to the individual 
workers to sue their employers, as improbable as it may be that the law 
could be effectively enforced in such a manner.  As such, the DT’s 
response was legalistic.  It met the narrow, formal requirements of the 
law without regard to the goals of enforcing the anti-subcontracting 
statute. 
It is important to note that such decisions by the Chilean Supreme 
Court narrowing the powers of the labor inspectorate are not uncommon.  
Chilean law professor José Luis Ugarte has already written about this 
phenomenon.
285
  He has argued that narrowed powers for the DT have 
 
that Codelco had appropriately hired the employees under the anti-subcontracting law.  
However, the concurring opinion distanced itself from the majority by arguing that the 
DT had the authority to decide whether or not an employer was violating the anti-
subcontracting law.  According to the concurring justice, the DT performed an otherwise 
legitimate “administrative act” when it attempted to determine if Codelco violated the 
anti-subcontracting law; therefore, the DT’s decision did not amount to an 
unconstitutional act of a “special commission.”  Additionally, the concurring opinion 
stated that the DT was especially justified in adjudicating the matter given its lack of 
standing to take subcontracting cases to the courts.  The concurring judge said that 
because the Supreme Court took away the DT’s authority to adjudicate matters through 
the administrative process, the Supreme Court was effectively making it impossible to 
enforce the anti-subcontracting law except through the complaints of individual workers, 
a remedy he considered “illusory.”  The judge likely found that enforcing the anti-
subcontracting law through individual complaints would be “illusory” due to classic 
collective action problems associated with large groups of plaintiffs who have individual 
claims worth relatively little compared to the cost of the suit.  Also, workers would 
possibly fear losing their jobs by bringing their claims to the courts as individuals.  Corte 
Suprema de Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 12 mayo 2008, Rol de la causa: 877-2008, 
953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008, 1073-2008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 1076-2008, 1150-
2008. 
 284.  See, e.g., G. Orellana et al., Justicia da Duro Golpe a la Dirección del Trabajo 
y Revierte Dictámenes Contra Codelco, ECONOMÍA Y NEGOCIOS ONLINE (May 13, 2008), 
http://www.economiaynegocios.cl/noticias/noticias.asp?id=46981. 
 285.  Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 129, at 203. 
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rendered some laws unenforceable, leading to flexible employment 
relations not by the will of the people, but that of the courts.  He states 
that: 
Indeed, this institutional mess that the [courts] have created, based 
mostly on ritually elliptical decisions, is allowing something 
unexpected for the world of labor relations in Chile: hard and fast labor 
flexibility, sustained by the weakening of the regulatory powers of 
labor inspection, to such an extent that most legal standards that 
protect workers could be unenforceable.
286
 
While we may agree or disagree over the legal correctness of the 
Supreme Court decisions, the truth is that some of its decisions are, in 
fact, rendering some parts of Chilean work law unenforceable.  Here, I 
argue that part of the problem may lie in the punitive orientation of the 
inspectorate and not just conservative jurisprudence. 
What could the DT have done differently?  Negotiate a plan for 
gradual compliance with the firm and the subcontractors.  In fact, this is 
precisely what the DT did prior to the Codelco case.  When the DT first 
attempted to enforce the subcontracting law it targeted the banking and 
retail industry.  It developed a plan to perform industry-wide, de oficio 
inspections to ascertain violations of the anti-subcontracting law.  Labor 
inspectors were sent across the Chilean territory inspecting banks and 
commercial establishments to make such findings.  After finding 
systemic violations, the inspectors issued fines against the employers.  
The fines were steep and the DT used the fines to leverage a settlement 
with the employers focused on compliance with the law.  Employers of 




Different from the Codelco case, the DT did not order the banking 
and retail employers to hire the workers.  A negotiated solution proved 
effective.  While my sources could not confirm to me why the strategy 
for Codelco differed – no fine was issued but, rather, a mere threat 
thereof was made – they did agree that there were heated discussions at 
the DT on how to approach the Codelco problem.  Some inspectors 
wanted to follow the same strategy used for banking and retail, but 
different opinions coming from superior levels of the institution, levels 
that also had to manage political pressures from the state-owned 
 
 286.  Id. at 203 (translation by author). 
 287.  César F. Rosado Marzán, fieldnotes of July 4, 2009. 
ROSADO FORMAT (DO NOT DELETE) 7/30/2012  10:58 AM 
394 HOFSTRA LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 29:2 
company and Presidency, prevailed.
288
  The different strategy proved, 
however, fateful for the DT. 
At least until the last days of August of 2010, when I finished my 
fieldwork in Chile, the DT did not proactively or meaningfully enforce 
the anti-subcontracting law.  Unauthorized discretion against a powerful 
employer backfired.  Some inspectors, as detailed previously, attempted 
to enforce the law through the blunt tool of indirect fining for unrelated 
infractions, such as informality.  While fining for unrelated infractions 
shows inspectors’ innovative capacities within a punitive framework, 
there is no evidence that this strategy is leading to compliance with the 
anti-subcontracting law.  In fact, the OECD has already faulted Chile for 
being noncompliant with its own subcontracting rules.
289
 
B. The Case of the 33 Miners in the San José Mine: Effective Resistance 
Even When Punishment is Legal 
In Chile, when the health and safety of employees is in danger, or 
employers persist in violating the law, labor inspectors may suspend 
work and even close a workplace.
290
  In a number of inspections that I 
attended, the inspectors partially suspended work when they observed 
situations where the health and safety of workers was at stake.  In one of 
these inspections, an inspection of a truck garage and repair shop in the 
industrial commune of Quilicura in Santiago, a worker was using a 
diesel-operated forklift that emanated fumes in an enclosed work area.  
The labor inspector ordered that the machine be stopped immediately.  
He even threatened management with calling the state police 
(carabineros) if the machine was not stopped.  As a result, the employer 
stopped the machine. 
In a separate inspection at a different workplace, the same inspector 
stopped a worker from working on the ceiling of the workplace while 
hoisted on a forklift.  According to the inspector, forklifts were made to 
hoist things, not people.  They were not safety ladders and workers could 
get severely hurt if hoisted by the machine.  As a result, the worker came 
down. 
 
 288.  Id.  
 289.  See ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD 
REVIEWS OF LABOUR MARKET AND SOCIAL POLICIES: CHILE (2009); see Diego López, El 
Informe Laboral de la OCDE 2009: Es Necesaria M s  eliberaci n  ol tica y Menos 
Recetas, FRIEDRICH EBERT STIFTUNG, http://library.fes.de/pdf-
files/bueros/chile/06785.pdf) (last visited June 8, 2012). 
 290.  Rosado Marzán, Another Miracle, supra note 14.  
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While stopping work is a powerful tool, labor inspectors are very 
careful when ordering work suspensions.  Workplace closings and 
suspension of work have faced stiff opposition from employers, making 
them controversial and sometimes placing the DT in the political 
spotlight. 
For example, in October of 2010, the world watched the incredible 
rescue of thirty-three Chilean miners buried under 2300 feet of solid 
rock.
291
  However, the international media said little about a piece of 
news that may have dampened the carnival feel of the event, but would 
have showed how the entire incident could have been easily averted.  
Only three weeks before the incident, a labor inspector had found serious 
structural deficiencies in the mine yet did little to avert the disaster.
292
  
The inspector reported these deficiencies after visiting the mine, 
confirming that a number of partial collapses in the mine had already 
caused grave injuries to some workers.
293
  In one case, a worker even 
suffered an amputation of his limbs.
294
  The inspector’s official report 
stated that that the mine had violated Chilean work law by: 
Not fortifying the ceiling, having noted that there was no fortification, 
reason why a ceiling sheet fell, not evaluating a risk situation . . . .  
Such fact constitutes noncompliance with the general conditions of 
safety in the workplace and implies not taking the necessary measures 




This crass violation of the health and safety regulations was 
punished with merely a fine equaling approximately U.S. $6,000.
296
  
While the fine fell within the formal confines of the law, it could have 
been much higher. 
Even more troubling was the fact that while the Chilean DT had 
authority to suspend work when the health and safety of the workers had 
been at risk, the DT did not order the mine to suspend work.
297 
 After the 
news media in Chile discovered that the DT had not closed the mine, the 
 
 291.  See Victor Herrero, All 33 Miners Rescued from Chile Mine, USA TODAY (Oct. 
14, 2010, 12:13 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2010-10-12-Chile-
miners_N.htm#.T5lP58BhJyY.email. 
 292.  Rosado Marzán, Another Miracle, supra note 14. 
 293.  Id. 
 294.  Id. 
 295.  DT, Resolución de Multa No. 6279/10/42 (July 9, 2010) (translation by author).  
 296.  Rosado Marzán, Another Miracle, supra note 14. 
 297.  Id.  
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DT responded that it did not have authority to close the mine.
298
  
According to the DT, the Sernageomin, a sub-agency of the Mining 
Ministry, which has less than 20 inspectors
299
 for the entire 2,600 mile-
long country,
300
 should have taken on the task of suspending work.  The 




Certainly, there is some language in the regulations of the 
Sernageomin that provided the government with a legal hook for its 
declarations.
302
  The Sernageomin specializes in geological and mining 
matters to produce and provide geological information and products, to 
exercise public oversight of the health and safety in the mines as a 
general matter, among other functions.
303
  Its regulations state in Article 
13 that it has “exclusive jurisdiction” to, among other things, 
“investigate work accidents, including those causing injuries to persons, 
grave injuries to property as the Service deems convenient . . . .”
304
  The 
Sernageomin can also compel mines to comply with the corrective 
actions that the agency mandates.
305
 
However, nowhere in the regulations does it state that the 
Sernageomin has exclusive jurisdiction over the general health and 
safety in the mines, including proactive and preventative inspections and 
actions to guarantee the health and lives of workers, as does the DT.  In 
 
 298.  Dirección del Trabajo: Sernageomin Autorizó Reabrir la Mina San José, LA 
NACION.CL (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://www.lanacion.cl/noticias/site/artic/20100817/pags/20100817100426.html. 
 299.  Diputado Robles Pide al Gobierno Aumentar Fiscalizadores del Sernageomin, 
LA TERCERA (Aug. 24, 2010), http://latercera.com/noticia/politica/2010/08/674-286293-
9-diputado-robles-pide-al-gobierno-aumentar-fiscalizadores-del-sernageomin.shtml; 
Encuentro de Seguridad Minera de Sernageomin Destacó Aumento de Fiscalizadores, 
AREA MINERA (Oct. 13, 2011), http://www.aminera.com/mas-noticias-
nacionales/36049.html. 
 300.  Chile is about 4,300 kilometers long, which translates to about 2,671 miles.  
Chile Guide: Practical Information, Tips and Tricks for Chile, CONTACT CHILE, 
http://www.contactchile.cl/en/chile-guide.php (last visited June 9, 2012). 
 301.  Ricardo Salazar, Ex  irector de Sernageomin: “No Quise Ni Acced  a 
Reabrir” la Mina San José, RADIO.UCHILE.CL (Aug. 17, 2010), 
http://radio.uchile.cl/noticias/78897. 
 302.  See ¿Qué es Sernageomin?, SERVICIO NACIONAL DE GEOLOGÍA Y MINERÍA, 
http://wwwold.sernageomin.cl/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=13&Item
id=135, (last visited June 9, 2012). 
 303.  Id. 
 304.  Law No. 132, Diciembre 30, 2002, DIARIO OFICIAL [D.O.], § Art. 13 (a) - (b), 
available at 
http://www.sernageomin.cl/pdf/mineria/seguridad/reglamentos_seguridad_minera/DS13
2_Reglamento_SEGMIN.pdf (translation by author). 
 305.  Id. 
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fact, the DT inspected the mine and issued fines, which shows that it 
certainly has jurisdiction over health and safety concerns in the mines, as 
in all workplaces.  Moreover, the rules giving the Sernageomin exclusive 
jurisdiction over ex post investigations involving workplace accidents in 
the mines were drafted as regulations produced by executive fiat – by a 
Supremo Decreto, or Supreme Decree — while the DFL No. 2, the 
governing statute of the DT and general labor inspection in Chile, is a 
Decreto con Fuerza de Ley (“DFL”), or Decree with the Force of Law – 
a law that rests higher in the legal hierarchy in Chile.
306
  DFLs, while 
issued by the executive of the country, have been authorized ex ante, as 
a blank check by the Chilean Parliament.  Supremo Decretos are, plain 
and simple, executive-mandated rules that cannot override a DFL
307
 
Finally, the government’s interpretation of Chilean law was at odds 
with the clear meaning of the DFL No. 2, the general labor inspection 
statute, which states in relevant part that, “Labor Inspectors can order the 
immediate suspension of work that in their opinion constitute imminent 
danger for the health or life of workers . . . .”
308
  Therefore, on July 9, 
2010 the labor inspector could have ordered the suspension of work in 
the mine after the inspector found the workplace to be hazardous.  The 
inspector did not take such action.  Rather, the DT abdicated to the 
Sernageomin’ s alleged exclusive jurisdiction on the subject, which is at 
odds with the law. 
Politics and power sometimes speak much more eloquently than 
legal text.  The main reason for the DT’s apprehension in disciplining 
the mine resulted from long-standing conflict between the DT and the 
mining industry, including that particular mine.  In 2003, the DT, under 
the direction of María Ester Feres, a former, particularly assertive 
Director and prominent work lawyer who cut her teeth during the 
Allende years, had actually closed the same mine after various accidents 
were reported there.
309
  However, as she confirmed to me, the mine was 
reopened shortly thereafter by the Sernageomin, which is known in 
 
 306.  See generally Sergio Endress Gómez, Essential Issues of the Chilean Legal 
System, GLOBALLEX, 
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/Chile.htm#_Types_of_Legislation (last visited 
June 11, 2012).  
 307.  See id. 
 308.  DFL No. 2, art. 28.  The original Spanish text reads: “los Inspectores del 
Trabajo podrán ordenar la suspensión inmediata de las labores que a su juicio 
constituyen peligro inminente para la salud o vida de los trabajadores . . . .” 
 309.  Email from María Ester Feres (Oct. 1, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter 
Feres]. 
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Chile for being friendly to mining economic interests.
310
  Government 




Such “pressures” from other government and state actors – likely 
influenced by employers – is not uncommon at the DT.  María Ester 
Feres told me via email that she was pressured during her tenure as 
Director to keep the San José mine open.
312
  She also felt pressured to 
issue dictámenes that would weaken the work laws.
313
  Other labor 
inspectors normally would complain to me about the interventions that 
the Treasury Department, the purse of Chile put on the DT, particularly 
when the public mining corporation would have to pay higher labor 




In 2010, the mine most likely opposed the punitive actions of the 
DT.  It mobilized resources so that other arms of the state, in this case, a 
sub-agency of the Mining Ministry, exercised jurisdiction over mine 
safety and closures.  Outgunned by the Mining Ministry, which is among 
the most powerful ministries in the Chile given the importance of the 
mining industry in the country, and without further support from the 
Presidency, the DT felt its hands tied.
315
  Thereafter it “gave up” on 
policing mine safety in that mine.  Rather than pursing a proactive 
agenda to protect health and safety in the mine, it abdicated to the 
Mining Ministry’s alleged exclusive jurisdiction over health and safety 
in mines, again, a claim of competency unsupported by the law, and 
merely fined the mine the equivalent of U.S. $6,000.  The DT’s actions 
narrowly met legal mandates because it fined the mine under the law, 
but disregarded workplace safety in the mine by issuing a practically 
meaningless fine. 
As these examples showed, the South American “jaguar” has an 
“underbelly” characterized by unauthorized discretion, particularly the 
 
 310.  I heard about these interagency conflicts not only with the Mining Ministry, but 
also with the Treasury Department and the Supreme Court of Chile, which is known for 
striking down some of the actions of the DT.  César F. Rosado Marzán, fieldnotes of July 
4, 2009. 
 311.  Feres, supra note 309; Ex Directora del Trabajo: No Pudimos Cerrar San José 
en 2001 por Presiones del Sector Minero, COOPERATIVA.CL (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://www.cooperativa.cl/prontus_nots/site/artic/20100818/pags/20100818192921.html
?comentpage=1&ts_arart=20100818192921#inicio_lista. The date mentioned in the 
article, 2001, is a typographical error. 
 312.  Feres, supra note 309. 
 313.  César F. Rosado Marzán, fieldnotes of July 28, 2009. 
 314.  César F. Rosado Marzán, fieldnotes of July 4, 2009. 
 315.  Feres, supra note 309. 
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use of illegal threats and legalism that coexist with the legitimate, 
judicial modes of innovation for rule-application.  The jaguar may 
pounce, but its soft underbelly is there, encumbering its effectiveness. 
VIII. THE PROMISE OF REMEDIAL STRATEGIES BACKED BY “BIG GUNS” 
While the inspectorate of Chile primarily employs punishment as a 
strategy for compliance, it does have some remedial and conciliatory 
strategies, albeit developed in the interstices of the agency.  As 
mentioned earlier, formal conciliatory and remedial, but marginal, 
inspection programs have existed and currently exist at the DT.  
However, dictámenes, mere guides interpreting the work laws binding 
only to the labor inspectors, also seem to serve important conciliatory 
and remedial roles. 
Dictámenes are formal roadmaps for the labor inspectors issued by 
their boss, the Director.  The DT’s Director issues dictámenes so that 
inspectors can understand the law and interpret and enforce it 
homogenously in the country.  As Chilean Professor Luis Lizama has 
already noted, while not directly binding on parties — and less so on the 
labor courts, which can impose their own interpretation of laws — 
dictámenes indirectly bind the public.
316
  Dictámenes provide the 
regulated actors with knowledge about how the DT interprets a 




While in Chile, I experienced one event where it was clear that 
dictámenes could be quite effective in helping the DT compel employers 
to comply with work laws.  On February 27, 2010, Chile experienced 
one of the most powerful and destructive earthquakes in recorded human 
history, measuring 8.8 on the Richter scale.
318
  The earthquake and the 
tidal wave that it produced destroyed significant infrastructure and killed 
hundreds of people.
319
  To make matters worse, during the days after the 
calamity, the economy came to a standstill in some parts of the country, 
looting took over major cities, and panic and anarchy ruled over many 
locations.  Employers began to massively terminate employees claiming 
that the economic calamity rose to the level of force majeure.  Force 
 
 316.  Lizama, supra note 185, at 59. 
 317.  Id. 
 318.  Alexei Barrionuevo, 1.5 Million Displaced After Chile Quake, NY TIMES (Feb. 
27, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/28/world/americas/28chile.html?pagewanted=all.  
 319.  Id. 
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majeure provides legal justification for dismissal in Chile without 
payment of mandatory severance pay.  Official statistics showed that 
employers justified about 9000 terminations as a result of the 
earthquake.
320
  Such terminations led to social crisis in some areas that 
already faced major physical destruction as a result of the earthquake.  In 
Concepción, Chile’s second largest city, experts estimated a 19% 
unemployment rate shortly after the earthquake in a country where a 7 to 
10% unemployment rate had been the norm for ten years.
321
 
In response to the possible social crisis, the President of the 
Country, Sebastián Piñera, ordered the DT to promulgate a dictamen 
limiting the scope of terminations that could be justified under force 
majeure as a result of the earthquake.
322
  The DT issued the dictamen on 
March 19, 2010.
323
  It essentially stated that employers could only use 
force majeure to justify terminations in cases where the earthquake 
directly damaged the business and rendered productive activity 
impossible.
324
  In April 2010, the DT claimed that as a result of the 
dictamen, Chilean employers had voluntarily rescinded about 2600 
terminations out of a total of 9000 terminations reported after the 
earthquake.
325
  The dictamen thus proved useful to inform employers 
about force majeure terminations in the context of an earthquake and led 
many to act commensurately with such administrative interpretations of 
the law. 
 
 320.  Gobierno Enviará Proyecto de Ley para Precisar Despidos por Fuerza Mayor, 
LA SEGUNDA (Apr. 27, 2010), 
http://www.nexchannel.cl/nexchannel/noticias/pdf.php?ver=4945892. 
 321.  Tasa de Desempleo Llegará a 19% en el Gran Concepción por Crisis de 
Empresas y Comercio, DIARIO AUSTRAL REGIÓN DE LOS RÍOS (Apr. 22, 2010), 
http://www.australvaldivia.cl/prontus4_nots/site/artic/ 
20100422/pags/20100422084541.html.  See generally DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO, 
INEQUIDADES Y BRECHAS DE GÉNERO EN EL EMPLEO: ANÁLISIS DE LOS RESULTADOS DE LA 
ENCUESTA NACIONAL DE COYUNTURA LABORAL ENCLA 2008 (6th ed. 2009), available at 
http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/articles-97629_recurso_1.pdf (providing general 
unemployment levels in Chile). 
 322.  César F. Rosado Marzán, fieldnotes of Apr. 22, 2010 (interviewing the Sub-
Secretary of the Ministry of Labor, Marcelo Soto). See also Piñera Restringe Norma que 
Permite Despidos de Trabajadores en Zonas Afectadas por Terremoto, EL MERCURIO 
(Mar. 22, 2010), http://www.nexchannel.cl/nexchannel/noticias/noticia_ 
pescrita.php?nota=4819450.  President Sebastián Piñera told the press that he will 
personally guarantee that the dictamen is enforced.  Id. 
 323.  DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO, ORD. No. 1412/021 (Mar. 19, 2010), available at 
http://www.dt.gob.cl/legislacion/1611/w3-printer-97663.html. 
 324.  Id. 
 325.  Gobierno Enviará Proyecto de Ley para Precisar Despidos por Fuerza Mayor, 
LA SEGUNDA (Apr. 27, 2010), 
http://www.nexchannel.cl/nexchannel/noticias/pdf.php?ver=4945892. 
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We can categorize the use of the dictamen as a judicial innovation 
by the DT to instruct employees and employers of their rights and 
obligations under the work laws as well as a device to obtain compliance 
results.  As Professor Lizama has stated it can de facto bind parties.
326
  It 
can also serve as a “teaching” tool. 
But let’s not forget, also, that the President of the country put all his 
weight on the publication and implementation of the dictamen.  The 
earthquake dictamen was not a regulation buried in an arcane publication 
solely for consumption by lawyers, such as the American Federal 
Register.  The earthquake dictamen was turned into a political tool of the 
Presidency, not just of the DT, and was publicized and discussed 
publicly when it was issued.  The message was clear: it may not be 
binding, but the government would enforce it if workers complained of 
an unfair termination.  The DT, thanks to government backing, could 
“speak softly and carry a big stick.” Classic “responsive regulation,” and 
even conciliatory and remedial Latin inspection, was put to work for a 
change. 
We should not take the Chilean dictámen’s pedagogical elements  
too far, however.  It is still a top-down, state-centric tool where the 
regulated actors play no formal part in determining its content.  It does 
not conform to ideal New Governance, responsive regulation, or ”Latin” 
remedial/conciliatory strategies.  Its use does attest to the insufficiency 
of mere punishment by a labor inspector as a tool of work law 
enforcement, validating claims made by New Governance, responsive 
regulation, and Latin inspection scholars that punishment-based 
regulation is insufficient at best.  Therefore, further experimentation 
with remedial strategies, and perhaps with more participatory ones, 
seems warranted. 
IX. CONCLUSION: AGAIN, BEYOND PUNISHMENT 
Sometimes, as in all areas of law enforcement, the inspector will better 
serve the people he seeks to protect by persuasive or educative appeals 
to the better nature of offenders than by prosecution. . . . [However, a] 
growing body of evidence suggests that in many countries the 
community has a surprisingly punitive attitude toward corporate 
offenses that cause loss of life or serious injury to persons.  It follows 
from the argument in this book that, if the community wants to indulge 
these sentiments fully, it will do so at the expense of further loss of life 
 
 326.  Lizama, supra note 185, at 59. 
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and limb. It will also be argued, however, that a far more punitive 
approach than presently exists in any country is needed . . . .
327
 
It is in the manner cited above that Professor John Braithwaite 
begins his now classic book, precursor of the responsive regulation 
school, To Punish or Persuade.  Those words, almost 30 years old, ring 
true today as they rung true back then.  In the case of Chile, there is no 
doubt that the San José mine needed to be closed by the labor 
inspectorate weeks before it collapsed.  It had to be treated much more 
harshly by the inspector.  It needed to be “incapacitated” with the 
inspector’s “big gun.”  It had to be shut down.  However, the inspectors 
simply gave a fine equaling U.S. $6,000 – chump change for a copper 
mine.  Why?  Part of the story has to do with the general punitive 
orientation of enforcement in Chile.  The DT was incapable of doing 
much else other than fine or close the workplace.  It had already closed 
the mine in 2003, only to see it reopened by Sernageomin, a move likely 
pressured by mining interests.  The intrusion of the sub-agency of the 
Mining Ministry led the DT to abdicate on the issue of closing the mine.  
When the second accident happened in 2010, the DT, pressured to keep 
the mine open and incapable of doing anything other than to impose a 
fine, chose to simply fine the mine narrowly under the law.  The mine 
then collapsed. 
The story of the mine would have been different if the DT would 
have been able to close the mine, convene the workers and owners of the 
mine, and perhaps even Sernageomin to structure a process to reopen the 
mine only after it met all health and safety standards.  But the DT did not 
have those powers.  It could only fine the mine or suspend work at the 
workplace.  The decision to reopen the workplace was handed down to 
another ministry whose main objective was not to provide safe 
workplaces, but rather, had an immediate urgency to keep jobs, which 
were later all lost once the mine totally collapsed.  Sernageomin retained 
authority over the mine with power, not law, on its side. 
We can tell a similar story with the Codelco case of 2008.  There, 
the DT should have had the power to order the mine to employ the 5000 
employees if they had, in fact, been illegally subcontracted by the state 
firm.  But the DT could not make such an order, and they were 
reprimanded by the Supreme Court of Chile for doing so.  The DT 
should have fined the mine and nothing else.  Whether the fine was paid 
or not, and whether DT could compel Codelco to comply in the future 
 
 327.  BRAITHWAITE, PUNISH OR PERSUADE, supra note 11, at 2-3 (1985) (internal 
citation omitted). 
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was outside the bounds of the DT’s competencies.  The situation could 
have been handled differently.  The DT, armed with the capacity to 
compel the firm to hire the workers and with other powers to request 
Codelco, the subcontractors, and workers’ representatives to meet and 
bargain a settlement to bring the company into compliance within an 
agreeable period of time could have been a more effective measure than 
that provided by the blunt mechanism of the fine and making illegal 
threats. 
In contrast to the Codelco and San José mining cases, the manner in 
which the DT handled the massive terminations during the 2010 
earthquake show that persuasion can work as a tactic of first order.  
There, the president of the country publicly supported a mere dictamen, 
an administrative interpretation of the law that is binding to no one but 
the labor inspectors.  Courts did not need to defer to it, but the dictamen 
was published widely and reported by the media.  Even though not 
binding, thousands of termination decisions were voluntarily rescinded 
by employers.  Perhaps it decided that retaining the employees was 
cheaper than facing the risk of fines and litigation. Maybe they were 
persuaded of the correctness and desirability of the dictamen´s 
interpretation.  Whatever the reasons, employers seem to have complied 
with the termination laws.  While the dictamen did not involve civil 
society in its promulgation—it was clearly a top-down state mandate—it 
did use persuasion to make employers comply with the law.  Rather than 
sending armies of inspectors to examine workplaces and fine employers, 
the government “spoke softly but carried a big stick.”  The strategy 
seems to have worked. 
The case of Chile continues to remind us that the use of mere 
punishment as a main tool to seek compliance with workplace laws is 
insufficient at best and counterproductive at worst.  Punishment is 
important.  Ensuring that tough sanctions are available for lawbreakers is 
truly important.  But punishment should not be the first and main 
method to get employers to comply with the work laws. 
Given the failures of Chile’s punitive approach, current legal 
scholarship calls for New Governance approaches, including responsive 
regulation and its elements, found in traditional Latin inspection.  For 
example, in wage theft cases, intentional violators of the law deserve 
nothing less than punishment.  Increasing sanctions against those 
lawbreakers matters.  However, it also matters greatly whether or not 
employers are violating the law merely out of ignorance.  In these cases, 
pedagogical inspections may help.  Furthermore, tripartite wage setting 
may also prove useful in setting minimum wages that are sensitive to 
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industry and market contexts. 
In the case of collective labor law, reform has proven impossible 
for almost thirty years.  Even if something like the EFCA is ever 
enacted, the efficacy of the statute will be quite uncertain if employers 
resist it through actions such as reorganizing production, litigation, and 
political jockeying, just like what occurred with the Wagner Act, which 
was resisted, challenged, and eventually deradicalized.
328
  Collective 
labor law reform through tripartite negotiations, as would be suggested 
by New Governance and an “old” governance institution, such as the 
International Labor Organization,
329
 seems warranted now more urgently 
than ever. 
Finally, swinging the pendulum back to a stricter OSHA will likely 
be as useless as the last similar swing.  Solutions to OSHA enforcement 
that include voluntary codes and the participation of workers in 
enforcement,
330
 continue to be one of the best prescriptions for change in 
health and safety law enforcement in the United States. 
Some scholars and others on the Right may argue that my approach 
here, as any regulatory approach, distorts markets and makes everyone 
worse off. To these critics we only need to show the recent failure of 
deregulation spurring the Great Recession as proof that a regulatory 
agenda is still needed.  On the other hand, some scholars and others on 
the Left may view my arguments here as hidden forms of deregulation. 
They are far from the truth.  Governance, responsive and “Latin” labor 
market regulation requires significant state investment in only the best, 
most professional regulatory agents possible who can skillfully exert 




 328.  See Karl E. Klare, Judicial Deradicalization of the Wagner Act and the Origins 
of Modern Legal Consciousness, 1937-1941, 62 MINN. L. REV. 265, 293 (1978). See also 
JAMES B. ATLESON, VALUES AND ASSUMPTIONS IN AMERICAN LABOR LAW 2 (1983) 
(arguing inherent property rights, needs of capital mobility, and the interests of continued 
productivity have led American courts to narrow the scope of labor rights under the 
National Labor Relations Act); ELLEN DANNIN, TAKING BACK THE WORKERS’ LAW: HOW 
TO FIGHT THE ASSAULT ON LABOR RIGHTS 21 (2006) (claiming that the common law is 
incompatible with labor law, and the fact that judges are trained in the common law has 
led to an erosion of worker’s rights under the NLRA by the court system).   
 329.  Labour Law, INT’L LAB. ORG., http://www.ilo.org/ifpdial/areas-of-work/labour-
law/lang—en/index.htm (last visited June 11, 2012). 
 330.  See supra text accompanying note 27.  
    331.   We only need to think back to the Gramscian “war of position” (trench 
warfare)– of strategically deploying resources, “on many fronts, in many trenches, with 
shifting lines of battle, where victories and defeats occur side by side in the same day”, 
where even obtaining state power is not enough as such power is contested and 
constantly challenged to realize that what I am advocating for here has a rich tradition in 
Left, working class advocacy – a “softer” cultural side for social change.  Clyde W. 
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The South American jaguar provides punitive tools to its labor 
inspectorate to enforce the country’s work laws.  Yet, the punitive 
orientation hides, albeit in plain view, an underbelly of noncompliance 
where workers cannot be protected and work laws are violated with 
impunity.  We should expect the same in the United States and beyond if 
we focus too narrowly on punishment.  Let us give the regulators and 
enforcers more power to sanction, but also more diversified toolkits so 
that they can utilize their authority in smarter, more effective ways. 
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